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ABSTRACT
Enhancing Online Security with Image-based CAPTCHAs
Brian M. Powell
Given the data loss, productivity, and nancial risks posed by security breaches, there is
a great need to protect online systems from automated attacks. Completely Automated
Public Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans Apart, known as CAPTCHAs, are
commonly used as one layer in providing online security. These tests are intended to be
easily solvable by legitimate human users while being challenging for automated attackers to
successfully complete. Traditionally, CAPTCHAs have asked users to perform tasks based
on text recognition or categorization of discrete images to prove whether or not they are
legitimate human users. Over time, the ecacy of these CAPTCHAs has been eroded by
improved optical character recognition, image classication, and machine learning techniques
that can accurately solve many CAPTCHAs at rates approaching those of humans. These
CAPTCHAs can also be dicult to complete using the touch-based input methods found
on widely used tablets and smartphones.
This research proposes the design of CAPTCHAs that address the shortcomings of existing
implementations. These CAPTCHAs require users to perform dierent image-based tasks
including face detection, face recognition, multimodal biometrics recognition, and object
recognition to prove they are human. These are tasks that humans excel at but which remain
dicult for computers to complete successfully. They can also be readily performed using
click- or touch-based input methods, facilitating their use on both traditional computers and
mobile devices.
Several strategies are utilized by the CAPTCHAs developed in this research to enable
high human success rates while ensuring negligible automated attack success rates. One
such technique, used by fgCAPTCHA, employs image quality metrics and face detection
algorithms to calculate a tness value representing the simulated performance of human
users and automated attackers, respectively, at solving each generated CAPTCHA image.
A genetic learning algorithm uses these tness values to determine customized generation
parameters for each CAPTCHA image. Other approaches, including gradient descent learn-
ing, articial immune systems, and multi-stage performance-based ltering processes, are
also proposed in this research to optimize the generated CAPTCHA images.
An extensive RESTful web service-based evaluation platform was developed to facilitate
the testing and analysis of the CAPTCHAs developed in this research. Users recorded over
180,000 attempts at solving these CAPTCHAs using a variety of devices. The results show
the designs created in this research oer high human success rates, up to 94.6% in the case
of aiCAPTCHA, while ensuring resilience against automated attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Over the past 30 years, the Internet has grown from a small network used by the government
and academic communities to become the backbone of global commerce and communications.
This expansion has been rapid since the turn of the century: from an estimated 400 million
people in 2000, the number of Internet users ballooned to 4.02 billion people by 2018 [1]. The
value of online commerce is increasing at a similarly rapid rate. In 2015, retail e-commerce
transactions alone totaled nearly $1.7 trillion and were expected to grow to $3.5 trillion by
2019 [2].
As high speed Internet connections have become widespread, individuals and businesses
have leveraged the benets of anywhere access aorded by the Internet by shifting more
of their computing needs to the cloud and other online systems. Gartner, an information
technology research rm, estimates that one-third of personal data, over one trillion giga-
bytes, is stored in the cloud [3]; 89% of enterprises store data on the public cloud and 17% of
enterprises have large virtual machine deployments (over 1,000 virtual machines) running in
public cloud infrastructures provided by companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Google
[4, 5].
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The shift to an increasingly online world is not without risk. Online and cloud computing
systems are vulnerable to a wide array of threats and issues. Some, like the risk of data loss
from physical failure or conguration problems, can aect any computer [6]. Others are
specic to online systems or are easier for attackers to exploit because of remote access. Key
concerns, summarized in Fig. 1.1, include:
1. Uncontrolled access can allow for inappropriate use of systems and wasted resources
including bandwidth, processor time, and disk space [6, 7, 8]. Systems lacking proper
access control can become host to spam posts, illegal le sharing, and in extreme cases,
can even attack other systems.
2. Denial of service (DoS) attacks can prevent users from accessing systems and data
[9]. There are several dierent types of attack, but most involve large amounts of
trac or requesting processor-intensive tasks that overwhelm networks and servers.
This problem has even impacted systems at West Virginia University, where several
services including the online directory were unavailable for extended periods due to
DoS attacks [10].
3. Compromised user accounts can allow unauthorized access to systems and data.
One common way of compromising accounts is by brute force or dictionary attacks
where automated bots repetitively attempt to login to a system until they nd a valid
username and password combination [11]. Other attacks take usernames and passwords
known from one system and attempt to use those credentials to login to other systems
in case individuals reused their account information [12].
4. Security vulnerabilities can provide nefarious users with ways to access data, install
software, change conguration settings, or crash systems [6]. New zero-day exploits,
attacks that utilize previously unknown weaknesses to gain unauthorized access to
systems, are now found on at least a monthly basis [13].
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Figure 1.1: Major threats aecting online and cloud systems.
The costs associated with these threats are staggering. A 2016 study estimated the
cost of a single data breach, such as what can occur with a compromised user account, at
$4 million [14]. For midsize businesses, costs associated with denial of service attacks average
about $40,000 per hour [15]. Even seemingly trivial issues like spam postings can result in
intangible costs from damage to a company's reputation.
1.2 Goal
Given the economic and non-economic risks associated with data breaches, DoS attacks, and
other security vulnerabilities, a great need exists for eective security tools to protect online
systems from these risks. Tools that restrict access to protected systems to human users are
particularly eective in ensuring system security. Many attack strategies rely on brute force;
these attacks must be automated to be practical and cost-ecient. If automated access is
prevented, many attacks become infeasible.
This dissertation seeks to develop eective security tools that prevent automated attacks
without imposing more than a minimal impact on legitimate human users. Specically, this
dissertation proposes new forms of Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell Com-
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puters and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs) [16] and the supporting tools necessary to facilitate
their public use. CAPTCHAs are a type of human interactive proof that is implemented
to restrict access to protected resources to users who are believed to be human. They re-
quire would-be users to complete tasks that are designed to be relatively easy for humans
to complete while being challenging for automated software to perform correctly [17]. If
users are able to successfully complete the required task, they are assumed to be human and
likely legitimate, and, subject to any other applicable restrictions, are granted access to the
protected resource.
As dened by Kluever [18], based on recommendations from researchers at Carnegie
Mellon University [19], the Palo Alto Research Center [20], and Microsoft Research [21],
eective CAPTCHAs must possess four properties:
1. Automated: It must be possible for a machine to automatically generate and grade
the challenges.
2. Open: The database(s) and algorithm(s) used to generate the challenges must be pub-
licly available to ensure that the diculty of the CAPTCHA stems from the underlying
hard articial intelligence problem and not a secret algorithm.
3. Usable: Challenges should be easily and quickly solved by humans. The test should
be as independent as possible of the user's language, physical location, educational
background, and perceptual disabilities.
4. Secure: The underlying AI problem must be a well-known and well-studied problem
where the best existing techniques are weaker than humans.
While CAPTCHAs have been in existence for over a decade, existing approaches have
shortcomings relative to these essential properties, particularly in the areas of security and
usability. These deciencies have become severe as automated attack strategies have grown
more sophisticated and as users move to mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones.
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reCAPTCHA, one common existing approach, provides only a 75% human success rate while
suering from an automated attack success rate higher than 40% [22, 23]. Better solutions
are clearly needed.
The CAPTCHAs proposed by this dissertation are designed to possess all four of Kluever's
required properties so they can provide eective security for all users. These new CAPTCHAs
provide human success rates of over 90% while having attack success rates approaching zero,
all while being readily usable across both traditional and mobile computing platforms.
1.3 Contributions
This work provides the following set of original contributions:
1. Design of eective CAPTCHAs facilitating easy use by legitimate human
users on traditional and mobile computing devices while resisting auto-
mated attacks. Existing CAPTCHA implementations, particularly those based on
text-based tasks, have signicant shortcomings in human usability, eectiveness as se-
curity tools, or both. These existing approaches are also dicult to complete with the
touch-based input methods used on increasingly common tablets and smartphones [24].
The image-based CAPTCHAs proposed in this research overcome these challenges by
utilizing tests based on face detection, face recognition, multimodal biometrics recogni-
tion, and object recognition. These tasks remain challenging for automated attackers
to perform while leveraging skills that even newborn babies possess [25]. They are
designed to allow easy use on desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones.
2. Creation of a testing environment and associated tools for evaluating human
performance on the CAPTCHAs proposed in this research. A CAPTCHA
Evaluation Platform consisting of a RESTful web service along with accompanying
client-side tools, website, and supporting database were developed to facilitate one
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of the largest human performance studies on CAPTCHAs completed to date. In to-
tal, more than 180,000 attempts were recorded through this platform as part of this
research.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview
of work relating to CAPTCHAs. Chapters 3-8 describe specic contributions in CAPTCHA
design. Chapter 9 details the evaluation platform developed to facilitate testing and analysis
of the CAPTCHAs created in this research. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the work by
providing a summary of accomplishments as well as future directions for research.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter reviews the history and development of existing CAPTCHAs and online security
techniques. Its intent is to provide readers with a basic understanding of relevant scholarship
in this area.
2.1 Non-CAPTCHA online security techniques
While a number of solutions exist to counter threats facing online computing systems, many
are not adequately scalable or suciently sophisticated to prevent attacks. Let us consider
several existing techniques.
2.1.1 Restricting anonymous access
One common strategy for protecting online systems is to require users to sign-in with a
user account to perform certain restricted actions. The actions that require a login vary by
system. For example, a newspaper website may allow all visitors to read articles but require
they login to post comments on a story to avoid spam postings. Requiring logins can help
protect against abuse of resource-intensive tasks, such as complex database queries, that can
be used to cause denial of service [9].
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This solution comes with a cost. Many users nd account creation and login requirements
burdensome and will avoid using these systems [26]. There is additional overhead involved
in maintaining user accounts and they do not entirely solve the problem. Spammers and
attackers have developed means of automating the account creation process, allowing them
to create new logins as needed [27]. In short, legitimate users are the only individuals being
impacted by account requirements.
2.1.2 Protecting account login systems
For systems requiring logins, one common approach for preventing brute force attacks is to
lock out accounts that have reached a specied number of unsuccessful login attempts [28].
When an account is locked out, it cannot be used to login. While this approach is benecial
in slowing or preventing brute force-based attacks, an undesirable side eect is that it can
be used as a Denial of Service attack (DoS) attack [29]. Attackers can force a lockout of the
accounts of legitimate users, thereby preventing them from accessing the system.
Another approach is to implement multifactor authentication. With this technique, users
must perform an additional verication task to prove who they are beyond entering a user-
name and password. For example, they may be asked to type-in a value from a SMS text
message [30] or from an app on their mobile device [31]. Attackers should not have access
to these verication codes, and as such, will be unable to login to the protected system.
Since the verication step generally occurs after the username and password have been ver-
ied, would-be attackers would know they have a valid username and password they could
then attempt to use on other systems. Since many users reuse credentials across systems,
attackers may be able to login to other systems not protected by multifactor authentication
[32].
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2.1.3 Protecting against security vulnerabilities
While the abilities that an attacker gains upon exploiting a software vulnerability vary
depending on the issue they exploit, it is safe to assume they have at least the same ability
to use system resources as the user account under which the compromised software runs.
For this reason, a good security practice is to use the principal of least privilege in granting
account permissions; accounts should receive the bare minimum permissions required to
complete a task [33].
Since it is inconvenient to constantly change user accounts, however, almost all users run
under accounts with more permissions than required [33]. Some services must run under
highly privileged accounts to fulll their duties, which makes them a particularly large risk
if they can be compromised. Microsoft attempted to mitigate these risks in Windows with
User Access Control (UAC), a prompt that requires users to grant permission for potentially
dangerous operations such as installing software and modifying system les [34]. When
the system is being used locally, this is eective since Windows will only accept input for
the UAC prompt from the keyboard or mouse, not from other software like a compromised
application. When accessed remotely via services such as Remote Desktop or Citrix, UAC
is vulnerable to attack since an attacking bot could spoof the remote user's input.
2.2 CAPTCHAs
CAPTCHA, Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans
Apart, are a type of human interactive proof employed to prevent automated access to online
systems [35]. They represent one solution to the limitations and side eects of the security
techniques discussed in Section 2.1. To gain access to protected systems, CAPTCHA users
must successfully complete tests designed to be readily solvable by human users but dicult
for computers to perform. The diculty that computers encounter in solving CAPTCHAs is
what makes these tests an eective security tool. Many threats to online systems, including
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those discussed in Section 1.1, rely on automated attacks to be feasible. An attacker who
must manually enter each password guess is not going to be able to test many passwords, and
as a result, will unlikely ever compromise a user account. A spammer who has to manually
send each spam message is not going to be able to send much spam. CAPTCHAs eliminate
the ability to have automated bots perform these tasks, and without the bots, the attacks
become too costly to be worthwhile.
2.2.1 Turing tests
As their name indicates, CAPTCHAs are based on Alan Turing's seminal 1950 proposal of
what has come to be known as the Turing test. In [36], Turing proposes an \imitation game"
where a human questioner interacts with two other participants via text-based communica-
tion. One participant is human, the other a computer. If the computer is able to provide
responses that are suciently advanced to the point that the human questioner is unable to
determine whether the participant is human or a computer, the computer passes the Turing
test.
CAPTCHAs employ a variation on this problem, sometimes referred to as a reverse
Turing test [37]. Instead of the questioner being a human as in the original Turing test,
with CAPTCHAs, it is a computer that generates and evaluates participant responses to the
tests. The CAPTCHA system asks participants to complete tests based on computationally
challenging tasks that are only expected to be solvable by humans [19]. If they are able to
complete the test, the CAPTCHA system assumes the participants are human and grants
access to the protected resource.
CAPTCHAs can be evaluated on two primary performance metrics, human success rates
and automated attack success rates. In designing CAPTCHAs, the goal is to maximize the
human success rate while minimizing the automated attack success rate. To be eective, a
CAPTCHA's automated attack success rate must be below 1% [38]. Human success rates of
at least 80% are preferred [39].
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2.2.2 Types of CAPTCHAs
Existing CAPTCHA implementations can be divided into one of seven categories [40, 41, 42]:
1. Text-based CAPTCHAs present users with text that has been visually distorted
or deformed. To solve the CAPTCHA test, users must accurately perform character
recognition and enter the text that is displayed [16].
2. Image-based CAPTCHAs can take several forms, but most are based on image
categorization tasks [18]. They generally require users to either identify embedded
images matching a specied descriptor (e.g., selecting cats or dogs [43]) or to categorize
existing unlabeled images.
3. Video-based CAPTCHAs, like image-based CAPTCHAs, are generally based on
categorization and labeling tasks. Users are instructed to watch a video and then select
an appropriate category or tag describing the video [18].
4. Audio-based CAPTCHAs most commonly require users to identify and type-in
letters or numbers that are read aloud in an audio le. They are frequently used as an
alternative to other CAPTCHA types for users with visual impairments [44].
5. Interactive CAPTCHAs require users to directly interact with and manipulate
elements of the CAPTCHA, most commonly by dragging and dropping items. This
category also includes CAPTCHAs that present the CAPTCHA task as a game [45].
6. Problem-based CAPTCHAs can take many forms including linguistic problems
that ask users to ll-in missing words in sentences, make sense of text, or answer simple
common knowledge-type questions [41]. Others may ask users to solve mathematical
problems or to utilize semantic relationships to organize objects [46, 47].
7. Behavior analysis-based CAPTCHAs analyze the system environment and user
behavior, sometimes including factors outside of the CAPTCHA test itself, to deter-
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mine if the user is human or computer [48]. They frequently incorporate other types
of secondary CAPTCHA tests.
2.2.3 Text-based CAPTCHAs
Text-based CAPTCHAs represent the most common implementation. These CAPTCHAs
graphically render a string of text designed to be dicult to evaluate using optical character
recognition (OCR) algorithms. The distorted text is shown to the user as an image le. The
user must correctly type-in the text to solve the CAPTCHA [16].
Early CAPTCHAs
The very rst CAPTCHAs were created in response to automated bot-driven \spam" sub-
missions that negatively impacted online services oered by AltaVista and Yahoo! [18, 20].
The AltaVista CAPTCHA was designed by reverse engineering OCR technology to focus
on its weaknesses [18]. The CAPTCHA generates a ransom note-style image consisting of
several alphanumeric characters, each rendered in a dierent font, and placed in random
positions on a colored stochastically generated background [49]. AltaVista attributed an
\over 95%" drop in spam submissions to the CAPTCHA at the time of its deployment [20].
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University coined the term CAPTCHA when designing
a solution to Yahoo!'s problems with automated bots [20]. Their solution is the Gimpy
family of CAPTCHAs shown in Fig. 2.1. Gimpy renders seven visually squished, stretched,
or skewed English words on a colorful background. EZ-Gimpy renders single English words
and the Gimpy-r variant uses a random string of four characters [50]. With attacks against
these CAPTCHAs having up to a 99% success rate [50], none of these approaches are secure.
Success of these attacks can be traced to two major weaknesses: (1) use of dictionary words
in the CAPTCHA, allowing an attacker to narrow its guesses [51], and (2) easily segmentable
characters, allowing individual letters to be identied by comparing shape outlines [50, 52].
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Figure 2.1: Samples of the Gimpy family of CAPTCHAs.
Character degradation CAPTCHAs
Character degradation CAPTCHAs add noise to CAPTCHA images so character outlines
become indistinct. This helps defeat OCR and character matching-based attack strategies.
Pessimal Print [37] adds salt-and-pepper background noise and random variation in char-
acter segment widths to simulate the changes that can occur with multiple generations of
photocopying a document. In testing by its developers, humans solved 100% of Pessimal
Print CAPTCHAs. However, the CAPTCHA also has a high success rate for attackers. By
leveraging Pessimal Print's use of dictionary words, the Mori-Malik attack [51] could defeat
the CAPTCHA with a 40% success rate [54].
BaeText [54] overlays a black-and-white image of geometric shapes such as squares,
circles, and ellipses on top of a text string. A dierence operation is conducted where the
text and geometric shapes intersect, yielding sections of white text on a black background
and black text on a white background. While this approach was not successful in stop-
ping automated attacks on its own with a 25% attack success rate [54, 55], its high 89%
human success rate has led to similar dierence operations being incorporated into other
CAPTCHAs as an added distortion [56].
The open source Securimage CAPTCHA [57] creates monochrome images containing
either two words or a randomly generated string. The characters are warped and distorted,
and then speckle noise and random lines are added to the entire image. In testing, human
users solved 99% of CAPTCHAs based on English dictionary words but only 74% of those
based on random characters [58]. Securimage's easily segmentable text is highly susceptible
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to neural network-based attacks on its letterforms, which achieve a near 100% attack success
rate [59]. Its English word variant is also vulnerable to dictionary-based attacks.
Segmentation-resistant CAPTCHAs
When the letters in a text-based CAPTCHA can be individually recognized, the task of
breaking the CAPTCHA devolves to simple single character recognition with accuracy rates
approaching 100% [60, 61]. Segmentation-resistant CAPTCHAs include features designed
to make isolation of individual characters challenging. Would-be attackers are required to
rst segment the CAPTCHA before they can attack the individual character forms, which
is a more dicult task. Several examples of these CAPTCHAs are shown in Fig. 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Examples of segmentation-resistant CAPTCHAs.
MSN CAPTCHA [66] represents one attempt at leveraging the segmentation problem. It
combines traditional CAPTCHA techniques such as character warping, rotation, and vary-
ing the stroke thickness with changing the positions of the letters and adding arcs running
through multiple letters. Unfortunately, signicant predictability in the text length and po-
sitioning in generated CAPTCHA images enabled the creation of a process to methodically
segment, deconstruct, and recognize the CAPTCHA with over 90% accuracy [60]. A later
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variant of this CAPTCHA, the Microsoft Two-Layer CAPTCHA [63] attempts to use warp-
ing eects, hollow characters, and close placement of its letters to prevent segmentation. It
is not much more secure, with an attack based on a series of systematic image processing
operations and use of a neural network achieving a 28% attack success rate. The Megau-
pload CAPTCHA [67], which rotates and overlaps individual characters in an attempt to
avoid segmentation, has also proven readily attackable with 78% accuracy. Its treatment of
coloring overlapping areas of text in white and non-overlapping areas in black inadvertently
provides outlines for attackers to use in the segmentation process.
ScatterType [68] takes the opposite approach of other segmentation-resistant CAPTCHAs.
Rather than connecting multiple characters, it divides six to eight individual letters into mul-
tiple pieces which are then visually scattered. Users must be able to reassemble the pieces to
form letters to solve the CAPTCHA. While this approach has human success rates approach-
ing 95%, three principal means of attacking this CAPTCHA have been identied [64]. The
attack vectors include reassembling the character fragments as in a jigsaw puzzle, leveraging
that the generated text strings are not fully random, and performing outline recognition
based on the use of one typeface (from a limited pool) to render the original words.
The commercial BotDetect CAPTCHA randomly applies one of 60 dierent distortion
techniques to its generated tests [69]. Its approaches include overlapping characters, adding
connecting lines, distorting or dividing letterforms, and varying character colors [70]. Despite
this wide variety of potential distortions, this CAPTCHA has been attacked using multiple
strategies including a computer vision-based approach achieving a 64% success rate [69, 71].
Several CAPTCHAs attempt to prevent segmentation by embedding text in complicated
backgrounds. Anti-SIFT CAPTCHA [72] embeds multicolored text into photographic back-
grounds, while Adamas [65] generates a geometrically complex multicolored background with
randomly shaped pieces. Six to eight multicolored distorted Unicode characters are placed
onto this background. The user is presented with the test image and a virtual keyboard con-
taining 25-30 Unicode characters including the test image's characters and visually similar
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Unicode homoglyphs, presented on the same style of background as the test image. Users
are directed to match the characters on the virtual keyboard to those in the test image by
clicking on the matching pairs. Humans achieved a 77.5% success rate in solving Adamas,
but they took an average of 111 seconds to complete an attempt. This exceptionally long
time is likely to drive away legitimate users and outweighs the CAPTCHA's 0% automated
attack success rate.
3-D CAPTCHAs
The 3D [73], tEABAG 3D [74], Ku6 [75], and Tencent [75] CAPTCHAs attempt to pre-
vent optical character recognition by rendering text as a three-dimensional object that can
be visually transformed or embedded into a background. These approaches are partially
successful at resisting simple OCR-based attacks, but Nguyen et al. [76] have developed a
novel attack which systematically removes the three-dimensional elements and converts the
CAPTCHA image to a simple text string that can be attacked with success rates of up to
76% for tEABAG 3D. Ye et al. [75] have achieved a 51% attack success rate against Ku6
CAPTCHA and a 69% rate against the Tencent CAPTCHA. Enhanced STE3D-CAP [77]
extends the 3D CAPTCHA idea by rendering the text as a stereoscopic image. Special 3D
stereoscopic glasses are required to view the CAPTCHA, limiting its practicality.
Real world imagery-based CAPTCHAs
While most text-based CAPTCHAs attempt to articially construct text unrecognizable
by OCR technology, some CAPTCHAs instead base their tests on real world images of
text. Handwritten CAPTCHA [78] relies on a database of English handwritten city names
and character images taken from U.S. mail packages not automatically identied by the U.S.
Postal Service's mail sorting system. Individual characters are combined to create words, and
both the natural and articially constructed words are distorted. Humans correctly identied
over 82% of these images, while automated attacks succeeded up to 12% of the time. An
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extension of this work, Synthetic Handwritten CAPTCHA [79], uses articially generated
cursive letters. While the synthetic handwriting had a lower 3% automated attack rate, the
human success rate was sharply lower compared to Handwritten CAPTCHA. Multilingual
Handwritten CAPTCHA [80] attempts to address the language dependency issues present in
the earlier handwriting CAPTCHAs by presenting users with CAPTCHAs from one of four
languages (English, Spanish, French, or Arabic) as appropriate for their detected location.
The original version of reCAPTCHA [81], shown in Fig. 2.3, takes a similar approach
to Handwritten CAPTCHA by using images of text from book digitization projects and
street addresses from Google Maps Street View photographs that could not be identied by
OCR technology [82]. Google uses the results collected from human users to perform useful
work; the previously unknown values are tagged with the human-provided responses using
a consensus-driven process. reCAPTCHA has become one of the most popular CAPTCHAs
[83]. As a result, it has attracted signicant attention in breaking the CAPTCHA both
from the academic community [56, 23] and would-be attackers. Attack strategies have been
developed with an over 40% success rate [23]. Attempts to counter attackers with increased
distortions have led to complaints that reCAPTCHA is becoming too challenging for humans
to solve [84].
Figure 2.3: Sample reCAPTCHA test. [85]
2.2.4 Image-based CAPTCHAs
As optical character recognition technology has improved, text-based CAPTCHAs have be-
come locked into escalating the intensity of distortions applied to the characters. This esca-
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lation negatively impacts human performance. To avoid this issue, there has been interest
in developing CAPTCHAs relying on a dierent mode of operation. One such approach is
to require users to identify or understand objects depicted in images.
Discrete image classication CAPTCHAs
The most common type of image-based CAPTCHA requires users to classify objects present
in discrete images. These CAPTCHAs generally follow one of two approaches: (1) users
identify a category for images they are shown or (2) users select from an image or set of
images those which match a specied description. ESP-PIX [53] and Activity Recognition
CAPTCHA [86], illustrated in Fig. 2.4, are examples of the rst approach. They present
users with a small set of images to categorize using predened options from a dropdown
list. While this approach is simple, it is also highly vulnerable to attack. Even a random
guess by an attacker has a non-trivial chance of being correct. Naming CAPTCHA [87]
attempts to address this shortcoming by providing users with a freeform text box to type-in
a descriptor for the images shown. Even after adjusting for spelling errors and synonyms,
this CAPTCHA achieved only a 74% human success rate in limited testing.
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Figure 2.4: Samples of discrete image classication CAPTCHAs where users choose an
appropriate category to describe presented images.
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KittenAuth [88], Asirra [43], SQUIGL-PIX [89], Simple Visual CAPTCHA [90], Con-
dent CAPTCHA [91], and Relacha [92] are examples of the second approach. Users are
instructed to select from a set of distinct images those which match a specied criteria, such
as kittens in KittenAuth or dogs and cats in Asirra. The presentation of distinct standalone
images, rather than a composite image, makes these approaches subject to straightforward
attacks using image classiers. One image classier-based approach has an 82.7% accuracy
rate in discriminating between dogs and cats as used by Asirra [93].
EmojiTCHA [94] asks users to categorize individual images rather than groups. It
presents users with a visually distorted photograph of a person's face. The user is then
asked to select from a predened list the emoji symbol which best represents the emotion
shown by the person in the photograph (e.g., happiness, sadness, surprise, anger). The
CAPTCHA's authors suggest using a series of EmojiTCHA tests to reduce the likelihood
of brute force guessing, but even when using three tests with three emotions each as they
suggest, the likelihood of random guesses solving the CAPTCHA is still a signicant 3.7%.
Composite image classication CAPTCHAs
Several image classication CAPTCHAs rely on composite images to reduce the likelihood
of image classier-based attacks. CaptchAll [95] presents users with an image containing
multiple embedded objects. Users are prompted to click on specic items within the com-
posite image to solve the CAPTCHA. Its authors do not provide human usability data, but
note a brute force attack success rate of less than 0.03%. Scene Tagging CAPTCHA [96]
implements a more advanced approach incorporating three dierent types of tests. The rst
asks users to click on a specied object (e.g., select a soccer ball). The second asks users
to identify an object by its relationship to another object (e.g., \name the object that is
directly to the upper-left of the buttery"). The third asks the user to specify how many
objects of a given type are present. Both of the latter types of questions provide users with
a list of predened answers, and, consequently, suer from the same high brute force guess
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rate as ESP-PIX. The complexity of Scene Tagging CAPTCHA's operation also increases
diculty for human users in correctly understanding and solving the test.
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Figure 2.5: Sample of IMAGINATION CAPTCHA [97].
The IMAGINATION CAPTCHA [97], shown in Fig. 2.5, uses a two-step process where
users select the geometric center of an image embedded in a larger composite image and then
label the selected image used a predened list. The CAPTCHA has a 4.95% automated
attack success rate [98], while providing only a 70% human success rate [97] due to the
CAPTCHA's complexity. In testing conducted for this research, users indicated the radio
buttons and long list of predened options made IMAGINATION cumbersome to complete
on a mobile device. Implicit CAPTCHA [99] is also challenging to use on mobile devices.
This CAPTCHA presents users with a large image from which they are directed to select a
specic small area, which can be dicult to complete on smartphones with small touchscreens
[100].
Face-based CAPTCHAs
Face detection and face recognition have long been challenging tasks for computers, which
makes them natural tests to use in CAPTCHAs. In [101], Misra and Gaj propose a face
recognition CAPTCHA that presents users with six discrete images. Three people are shown
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twice, once in the rst column and once in the second column, as depicted in Fig. 2.6. Users
match the images of the same people to solve the CAPTCHA. Because of its design, the
CAPTCHA has a high 1-in-6 random guess success rate that renders it insecure.
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Figure 2.6: Example of the Misra and Gaj CAPTCHA [101].
ARTiFACIAL [21] asks users to identify the location of the eyes and mouth on a natural-
looking face that is presented among a series of visually perturbed faces. While the CAPTCHA
achieved a 78% human success rate, many users surveyed about ARTiFACIAL provided neg-
ative comments about its appearance [102]. Comments that the CAPTCHA was \eerie,"
\disturbing," and \creepy" helped halt its adoption [102, 18]. ARTiFACIAL is also vulner-
able to attack, with Zhu et al. demonstrating an attack method with an 18% success rate
[98].
Image orientation CAPTCHAs
Directcha [103] relies on user knowledge of how a pictured object should appear. Users are
presented with an image of a rotated object. An entry pad is provided with several options
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to indicate which direction the model is facing. In extremely limited testing with three
participants attempting a set of eight images, Directcha achieved a 92% human success rate.
The CAPTCHA's authors did not conduct testing with automated attackers, but a single
instance could be expected to have a high 12.5% brute force attack success rate.
2.2.5 Video-based CAPTCHAs
Video-based CAPTCHAs ask users to watch short video clips rather than view images or
text. Transmission of video imposes heavier bandwidth requirements on users compared to
still images, which can make video-based CAPTCHAs ill-suited for use on mobile devices or
through slow Internet connections.
Keyword-tagging CAPTCHAs
Keyword-tagging CAPTCHAs prompt users to provide descriptive keywords after watching a
short video clip, similar to how ESP-PIX asks users to categorize still images [53]. Examples
of these CAPTCHAs are depicted in Fig. 2.7. In Kluever's Video CAPTCHA[18, 104], users
watch a video from YouTube and then type-in three descriptors. These descriptors are
then compared against keywords specied by the video's original author using a keyword
stemming and matching process. The large number of videos on YouTube provides a large
source database, but the publicly accessible database also represents a potential attack vector
if a would-be attacker is able to locate the matching video on YouTube. In testing, humans
achieved a 90.2% success rate in solving Kluever's CAPTCHA [18] and automated attackers
had a signicant 13% success rate [104].
The K L University CAPTCHA [105] asks users to watch YouTube videos of commercial
advertisements that have been modied to block out the name of the product being adver-
tised. After viewing the CAPTCHA, the user is asked to select the type of product featured
in the advertisement from a predened list. This approach is highly attackable due to the
small number of options (four) that users choose from for their answer.
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(a) Kluever's Video CAPTCHA [105]
(b) KL University CAPTCHA [105]
Figure 2.7: Examples of keyword-tagging video CAPTCHAs.
Moving object recognition CAPTCHAs
An alternative video-based approach is to embed objects or text strings that move within a
video as it plays. To solve the CAPTCHA, users identify these objects by clicking on them
or typing in their text as appropriate. Cui et al. [106, 107] proposed a three-dimensional
CAPTCHA based on moving text but never publicly disclosed a full implementation of their
work. NuCAPTCHA [108] is a commercial implementation based on text that oats within
a video image. While it has a 95% human success rate [109], the design choices enabling
this high human success rate also make NuCAPTCHA easy to attack, thereby limiting its
usefulness as a security tool. By exploiting the CAPTCHA's use of rigid character outlines,
high contrast colors, non-overlapping movement trajectories, and reduced alphabet, Xu et
al. achieved a 77% attack success rate [110].
2.2.6 Audio-based CAPTCHAs
Audio-based CAPTCHAs are commonly used as an accessible alternative to other forms of
CAPTCHA for users with visual impairments. These CAPTCHAs impose additional system
requirements compared to traditional visual CAPTCHAs since users are required to listen
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to or record sound, which may not be possible on all types of computing devices or in all
environments.
Listening CAPTCHAs
The most common form of audio CAPTCHA requires users to listen to a noisy or distorted
sound clip and then type-in the words or numbers they hear. A number of implementations
in this vein have been created by websites such as Authorize, Yahoo!, Google, eBay, Slash-
dot, and Digg [22], as audio-based alternatives for visual CAPTCHAs such as reCAPTCHA
[111], and as standalone tests [112, 113]. While benecial for accessibility purposes, this
type of CAPTCHA is not secure. A number of successful attack strategies have been de-
veloped against this form of CAPTCHA involving ltering out added noise then analyzing
the remaining sounds with voice recognition software [114, 115, 111]. Given the widespread
use and advanced stage of development of voice recognition software, it is expected that this
type of software would be able to accurately recognize the speech from these CAPTCHAs
[116].
Meutzner et al. [117] and Yamaguchi and Kikuchi [118] have both proposed CAPTCHAs
where users listen to computer-generated audio of words being read, but instead of adding
noise or distorting the audio to deter attacks, these CAPTCHAs include nonsense word-like
syllables intermixed with actual words. To solve these CAPTCHAs, users must correctly
identify the real English words while ignoring non-word sounds. These solutions demon-
strated poor human success rates in testing: Meutzner achieved only 29% accuracy when
evaluating sentences and one tested conguration of Yamaguchi's scheme had a low 56%
success rate.
Natural sound CAPTCHAs
The Human-Interaction Proof, Universally Usable CAPTCHA (HIPUU) [119] is designed to
accommodate both sighted and non-sighted users. It displays an image while simultaneously
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playing a sound eect appropriate for that image (e.g., the sound of thunder plays with a
picture of lightning, or a bird sings while a bird is displayed on-screen). Users then choose
a descriptor from a dropdown list corresponding with the image and sound. Despite the
xed number of options available in the dropdown list, HIPUU achieved only a 46% human
success rate in testing. Completing the CAPTCHA using the audio-based method is a slow
process, taking 65.6 seconds on average. Ryu et al. [120] propose a similar CAPTCHA that
asks users to listen to a sound and then select a pictogram corresponding to the sound. No
user testing was conducted, but its use of a limited number of xed options suggests it is
vulnerable to random guess-based attacks.
The SoundsRight CAPTCHA [121] asks users to identify when a certain type of sound
(e.g., rooster crowing, crickets chirping) occurs in a played audio clip. Users are told the item
to listen for before the clip plays and use the spacebar on their keyboard to denote when the
sound starts and stops. The times they select for the beginning and end of the sound are
compared to prerecorded values to determine if the user is human. This approach achieves a
92% success rate but its authors note that it is limited by the small number of sounds which
humans are able to readily distinguish. Since this CAPTCHA's test only involves sound, it
must be paired with a visual CAPTCHA to accommodate deaf users.
Audio analysis CAPTCHAs
Rather than asking users to identify sounds or recognize words and numbers, the HuMan
CAPTCHA [122] requires participants to analyze audio recorded in public settings such as
train stations and sporting games. Users are asked to type-in answers to context-sensitive
questions based on the played audio, such as when a specic train is departing. Users can
personalize the type of tests they are given through congurable options in the CAPTCHA's
user interface or they can be selected at random. In testing with randomly selected questions,
the average time to completion was over 35 seconds; personalized questions were answered
somewhat faster, in 23-25 seconds. Study participants who were non-sighted were slightly
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faster on average than sighted users in completing the tests. The average success rate was
approximately 92%. HuMan's authors believe the CAPTCHA is resilient against attack due
to the diculty of recognizing the sounds in the audio and then answering context-sensitive
questions, but the ability for users to manually customize the types of questions represents
a signicant security weakness.
Recording CAPTCHAs
Reading CAPTCHA [123] inverts the normal process used by audio CAPTCHAs; instead of
having users play audio, they are required to record it. Users are provided with a passage of
text to read. Their voice is recorded and uploaded to the CAPTCHA server, which analyzes
it to determine if it was a natural human reading or a machine-generated voice. Reading
CAPTCHA's authors claim a 97% success rate for humans with a 4% attack success rate,
but this CAPTCHA has practical usability shortcomings since many desktop computers do
not have microphones. It would also be dicult to obtain a clear recording in a public or
noisy environment.
2.2.7 Interactive CAPTCHAs
Several CAPTCHA designs have been developed which require users to manipulate elements
of the CAPTCHA. While these approaches can be more secure than other implementations,
many have signicant usability limitations.
Drag-and-drop CAPTCHAs
Several interactive CAPTCHAs employ tests requiring users to complete drag-and-drop ac-
tions to solve the CAPTCHA. MosaHIP [124], Drag and Drop CAPTCHA [125], MOVTCHA
[126], and Interactive CAPTCHA [127] direct users to drag and drop items onto prescribed
objects hidden within a larger composite image. Zhang's CAPTCHA [128] instructs users
to drag the picture matching a specic object into a special drop area. Mobile devices, such
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as smartphones and tablets, currently lack consistent support for drag-and-drop actions,
rendering these CAPTCHAs unusable [129].
Visualization and orientation CAPTCHAs
Sketcha [130] incorporates line drawings based on three-dimensional models of real-world
objects. Users are shown a series of 3-D model sketches, each presented from a random
viewpoint and rotated to one of four increments. To solve the CAPTCHA, users must rotate
the images to their original upright position. In testing, humans had a 78% success rate
in solving an individual image but scale vector machine-based attackers had 61% accuracy.
Sketchas normally contain eight images which must be rotated. This limits the automated
attack success rate to 1.9% but also results in an extremely low 13.7% human success rate
[130].
RotateCAPTCHA [131] presents users with a photograph divided into two concentric
circles. Users solve the CAPTCHA by correctly rotating the contents of both circles to their
upright position, aligning them to each other in the process. This CAPTCHA achieved a
71% human success rate in testing. Its authors do not believe an automated attack is likely,
but it seems that an approach based on repeated rotations of each component and checking
for the alignment of embedded lines could have reasonable success.
CAPTCHaSTAR [132] displays a dynamic image representing a star eld. As users move
their mouse cursor or nger on a touchscreen, the stars realign. Users are instructed to
continue moving their pointer until the stars align to form the outline of an image. This
process is somewhat slow; in testing, users took between 15 and 60 seconds, on average,
depending on the diculty of the CAPTCHA. Human success rates ranged from 46% to
91%. Attacks using support vector machine classiers achieved a 78% success rate.
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Dynamic cognitive game CAPTCHAs
Dynamic cognitive game (DCG) CAPTCHAs combine drag-and-drop or other dynamic
movement with puzzle-like games [45]. By presenting the test as a sort of game, DCGs
aim to reduce the resistance many human users have to using CAPTCHAs. In [45], Mo-
hamed et al. propose games based on matching shapes, feeding animals, parking boats, and
placing ships on a sea. Yang et al. [133] developed tests based on rolling balls and simu-
lating the game Dance Dance Revolution. Several commercial implementations also exist,
such as PlayThru [134], which asks users to complete tasks such as building a hamburger.
While users can solve these tasks quickly and accurately in testing, they suer from success-
ful attack strategies approaching 100% accuracy [135]. DCGs also commonly have usability
diculties on mobile devices due to use of drag-and-drop input methods and Adobe Flash
[136].
2.2.8 Problem-based CAPTCHAs
Due to the usability issues found in many traditional CAPTCHAs, some websites eschew
them in favor of logic or language questions.
Mathematics CAPTCHAs
Several CAPTCHA approaches require users to complete mathematics problems in lieu of
recognizing text or images. QRBGS CAPTCHA [46] is one example. It asks users to solve
problems based on simple mathematical operations, such as multiplication and division, as
well as more challenging tasks like solving for algebraic variables and calculating derivatives.
The human success rate for this CAPTCHA are not available, but a note displayed with
the CAPTCHA test suggesting users reload the page to obtain an easier test suggests it
may not be high. Automated attackers achieved an overall success rate of 44.5%, which may
represent an unusual case where computers are more successful at solving a CAPTCHA than
humans. Other mathematics CAPTCHAs tend to use easier tests. For example, Securimage
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[57], while primarily a text-based CAPTCHA, includes an option that generates tests based
on simple addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division problems.
Language analysis CAPTCHAs
The Strangeness in Sentences CAPTCHA (SS-CAPTCHA) [137] presents users with a series
of English sentences, some of which were written by humans and others which were created by
machine translation and include non-standard language. Users are asked to identify which
sentences seem natural and which appear \strange." In testing, humans achieved a 90%
success rate in categorizing natural versus strange sentences. By the nature of its design,
SS-CAPTCHA is language-dependent; non-native speakers of the language used in its tests
are likely to encounter diculty in correctly identifying if the sentence is strange or not. SS-
CAPTCHA's authors note it is subject to attacks based on search engines and re-translation
convergence but they do not quantify the exact likelihood of these attacks succeeding.
Semantic relationship CAPTCHAs
Several text- and image-based CAPTCHAs have been developed that require users to un-
derstand semantic relationships between items. Examples of this form of CAPTCHA are
depicted in Fig. 2.8. Bongo [16] presents users with two sets of images, each set containing
images with some common visual characteristic such as having bold lines versus thin lines
or solid shapes versus hollow shapes. The user is provided with a single image and asked to
identify the set to which it belongs. As there are two possible choices, a single Bongo in-
stance has an inherent 50% random guess success rate. To reduce its vulnerability to random
guess-based attacks, multiple Bongo instances can be used together [138]. This, however,
requires a substantial amount of screen space or that the user complete multiple rounds of
tests.
SEMAGE [141] presents users with a set of images and asks them to recognize relation-
ships between the images by choosing those which are of the same type of object. Users
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Figure 2.8: Examples of semantic relationship CAPTCHAs.
achieved a 94.8% success rate in testing. No attack analysis has been completed on this
CAPTCHA, but it appears to be vulnerable to simple image classier-based attacks due to
its use of discrete images. DeepCAPTCHA (2017) [139] functions similarly, asking users to
select objects matching a presented example. To deter image classier-based attacks, the
presented example image is visually distorted with immutable adversarial noise computed by
a deep learning algorithm. While the CAPTCHA achieved an 82.6% human success rate, it
remains vulnerable to brute force attacks. DeepCAPTCHA's authors recommend requiring
users complete at least two CAPTCHAs as part of the verication process.
SemCAPTCHA [140] takes the opposite approach to SEMAGE and DeepCAPTCHA
(2017). It presents users with rendered text of various object names and asks users to
identify which one does not belong. For example, users might be asked to choose which item
does not t from ducks, cuckoo birds, and cows. Again, humans performed well, solving this
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CAPTCHA in under 5.5 seconds on average. No automated attack rates are available, but
an attack seems trivial to complete given the availability of highly accurate optical character
recognition and the small number of words embedded in each SemCAPTCHA image.
Another CAPTCHA named DeepCAPTCHA [47], released in 2014 by Nejati et al. and
unrelated to the 2017 CAPTCHA of the same name, presents users with a set of similarly
sized images representing various objects. Using their knowledge of depth perception and
relative sizes, users are asked to order the images by the size of the real world objects they
depict. It achieved an 87.7% human success rate in testing. While its authors claim a low
automated attack success rate, its use of discrete images makes its vulnerable to highly
accurate image classiers.
2.2.9 Behavior analysis-based CAPTCHAs
Another approach to avoiding the challenges posed by increasingly sophisticated OCR and
image recognition technology is to make decisions on whether or not a user is human based
on their recorded behavior. Google has been a leader in this area. Their reCAPTCHA v2
(also known as No CAPTCHA reCAPTCHA) [48] system presents users with a checkbox
labeled \I'm not a robot" as shown in Fig. 2.9. Users click or tap this checkbox to certify
they are human. If reCAPTCHA's risk analysis system believes the user is human, they are
granted access to the protected resource; if it does not, the user is required to complete a
secondary image classication or text-based reCAPTCHA test [142]. Invisible reCAPTCHA
[48], an alternative implementation, foregoes the initial \I'm not a robot" checkbox; when
the risk analysis system is unsure if the user is human, the CAPTCHA goes straight to an
image classication task.
Much of how these approaches determine if the user is actually human is not publicly
known. Google indicates the CAPTCHAs make use of an \advanced risk analysis backend"
to make this determination [144]. Researchers have identied that the risk analysis process
includes evaluation of factors such as the user agent string, browser environment, mouse
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Figure 2.9: Samples of reCAPTCHA v2 (No CAPTCHA reCAPTCHA) [143].
movements when solving the CAPTCHA, and the existence of a suciently old Google
tracking cookie [142, 145]. While these CAPTCHAs enable a smooth user experience, since
most users complete either a simple CAPTCHA or no CAPTCHA at all [146], they have
signicant security vulnerabilities. Sivakorn et al. [143] have developed strategies to increase
the likelihood that a user will be shown the \I'm not a robot" checkbox test, rather than a
full CAPTCHA, and then to solve the checkbox test. In the event a secondary CAPTCHA
is displayed, attacks can defeat the image classication task with 71% accuracy [143] and
text-based tests with a 40% success rate [23]. Even robots have been shown to successfully
complete reCAPTCHA v2's \I'm not a robot" test [147].
2.3 Summary
Since the advent of the Internet, signicant eort has been dedicated to creating strategies
to protect online systems from automated attack. CAPTCHAs are one of the most visible
and heavily used security tools. Despite the creation of a multitude of approaches, few im-
plementations successfully balance the need for ease of use by humans across a wide variety
of platforms with resistance against automated attackers. In this research, we seek to ex-
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plore new approaches that achieve these important goals by providing good user experiences
without sacricing security.
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Chapter 3
Face Detection CAPTCHA
3.1 Proposed approach
3.1.1 CAPTCHA design
Face Detection CAPTCHA [148] is an initial approach designed to avoid the security and
usability shortcomings of existing CAPTCHAs by using tests based on complex composite
images. It presents users with an image that includes several embedded human and non-
human faces. The faces are visually distorted and randomly placed on a noisy background.
To successfully solve the CAPTCHA, users must correctly click on all genuine targets, the
human faces, without any erroneous clicks. An example of Face Detection CAPTCHA
marked to indicate the correct solution is shown in Fig. 3.1.
Face Detection CAPTCHA provides several benets over existing approaches. Compared
to text-based CAPTCHAs, this methodology avoids the escalating diculty caused by im-
proving OCR technologies. It also avoids potential language barriers since no text is used,
making the design language-independent and thus deployable to a global audience. Since
Face Detection CAPTCHA involves no text entry, it can easily be used on mobile devices
that lack a convenient keyboard. Compared to existing image-based CAPTCHAs, this ap-
proach does not rely on small classication sets, like ESP-PIX, or display discrete images,
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Figure 3.1: Sample Face Detection CAPTCHA image with correct answers circled in red.
which can allow a high likelihood of success for brute force attacks by automated algorithms.
Human face detection is a complicated task for computers to successfully perform, especially
when the faces are visually distorted and presented in complex composite images. Unlike
previous face-based CAPTCHAs, Face Detection CAPTCHA uses natural-looking faces to
avoid user concerns about eerie and disturbing images [102], and it presents the faces as part
of a composite image to minimize the likelihood of a successful brute force attack.
3.1.2 Generation process
 
CAPTCHA 
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Figure 3.2: Steps involved in generating Face Detection CAPTCHAs. First, a complex
background image containing many shaded rectangles is generated. Next, face and non-face
images are selected for embedding, then distortions are chosen and applied to the face and
non-face images. These distorted images are then placed on the background, yielding a
completed Face Detection CAPTCHA image.
As shown in Fig. 3.2, creating Face Detection CAPTCHA images is a multi-step process.
It can be represented as:
C = F (; Igenuine; Ifake) (3.1)
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where function F creates a new CAPTCHA image containing embedded images taken from
sets Igenuine and Ifake. Distortion settings (distortion types and distortion intensities) selected
from  are applied to the rendered composite, yielding CAPTCHA C.
Background generation
Generation of a new Face Detection CAPTCHA image begins with the creation of a new
500  300 pixel background composed of overlapping grayscale rectangles of various sizes
as shown in Fig. 3.3. The noisy background's pattern of overlapping shapes, colors, and
lines is designed to thwart the eectiveness of using edge detection to identify the outline of
embedded face images.
Figure 3.3: Sample of the rendered background [148].
Image selection
After the background is created, four to ve genuine human faces and fake non-human faces
are chosen to be embedded so that:
ntotal =
n
ngenuine + nfake
 ngenuine  1; nfake  1; ntotal = f4; 5go (3.2)
where ngenuine, nfake, and ntotal represent the number of embedded genuine, fake, and total
images, respectively. At least one embedded image is genuine and another is fake. Each
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embedded image is converted to grayscale and scaled to a randomly selected size between
50 50 and 100 100 pixels.
Distortion selection and application
To increase the diculty for a would-be automated attacker to solve Face Detection CAPTCHA,
each generated CAPTCHA is visually distorted. For the CAPTCHA, one distortion type is
selected at random from Table 3.1 to be applied to each embedded image. Each distortion
type has one to three associated xed intensity levels, and one intensity level is selected at
random for use with the CAPTCHA image.
Table 3.1: Face Detection CAPTCHA distortion types and intensities [148]
Distortion Used Parameters Adjusted
Intensity Level
Low Medium High
Blurring Standard deviation 4 8 20
Closing Radius 3 5 -
Erosion Radius 3 - -
Laplacian ltering a - 10 5
Lighten Histogram max-range - - 0.3
Periodic noise % of image removed 67% - -
Piecewise scaling Scale factor 2:1 3:1 -
Resolution modication Scale factor 1:4 1:8 1:10
Rotation Degrees rotated - 90 180
Width scaling Scale factor 4 5 -
Height scaling Scale factor 2.5 3 4
Speckle noise Variance 0.2 1 -
No distortion - - - -
As an example, the lighten distortion can be applied to an image using the equation:
v0(x; y) =
n
min
 
v(x; y) + 255'; 255
  0 < ' < 1o (3.3)
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where v(x; y) is the original value of the 8-bit grayscale pixel at coordinates (x; y). ' is the
intensity level for the lighten distortion. v0(x; y) is the resulting value for pixel (x; y) after
the distortion has been applied. The images shown in Fig. 3.4 model the lighten distortion
when applied to the Lena image [149].
(a) Undistorted image (b) ' = 0:6 (c) ' = 0:3
Figure 3.4: Lena image with applied lighten distortions.
Another example of distortion is blurring using the 2D Gaussian equation [150]:
G(x; y) =
1
22
e 
x2+y2
22 (3.4)
where x represents the horizontal distance from the origin, y represents the vertical distance
from the origin, and  is the standard deviation. When the Gaussian blur distortion is
applied to the Lena image, the resulting distorted images are displayed in Fig. 3.5.
(a)  = 4 (b)  = 8 (c)  = 20
Figure 3.5: Lena image with applied Gaussian blur [148].
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Image placement
Once each embedded image has been distorted, locations are randomly chosen to place each
image on the background. The distorted face images are randomly placed so that no two
images overlap with the other. Fig. 3.6 shows examples of nal CAPTCHAs generated with
the process described.
Figure 3.6: Samples of generated Face Detection CAPTCHA images.
3.2 Experimental results and analysis
Face Detection CAPTCHA images underwent testing by 1,100 participants. This section
provides details on the source images, research participants, and protocols used in evaluating
the CAPTCHA along with results and analysis.
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3.2.1 Image databases
The embedded images used in Face Detection CAPTCHA were sourced from publicly avail-
able online images. Genuine human face images were chosen from a subset of Carnegie
Mellon University's Front Face Images database [151]. Fake non-human face images were
taken from photographs of animals and puppets posted on Flickr [152].
3.2.2 Participants and testing protocol
To evaluate human accuracy in solving Face Detection CAPTCHAs, a group of 1,100 indi-
viduals was asked to access a website protected by the CAPTCHA. Users were unsupervised
and allowed to access the website using their choice of browser and computing device. For
each attempt, the CAPTCHA Evaluation Platform (see Chapter 9) was used to present
a CAPTCHA newly selected from a set of 1,156 images. Users were asked to continue
attempting to solve CAPTCHAs until they were successful.
Automated attacks against the CAPTCHA were simulated using the Viola-Jones face
detection algorithm [153]. This algorithm works by calculating the integral image, the sum
of all pixel values to the left and above a given point, as shown by:
ii(a; b) =
X
a0a;b0b
i(a0; b0) (3.5)
Here, a; b are points, i(a; b) is the original image, and ii(a; b) is the corresponding inte-
gral image. Using the integral image, a series of Haar-like rectangular features are computed
across the image. The rectangular features are run through a cascade of classiers to deter-
mine the probable locations of embedded faces [153, 154].
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3.2.3 Analysis
Human performance evaluation
In total, 8,995 attempts at solving Face Detection CAPTCHA were recorded with an overall
average success rate of 71.8%. As shown in Table 3.2, human success rates varied signicantly
depending upon the type of distortion applied. When no distortion was applied, the human
success rate was 82.48%. When distortions were applied, rates varied from 81.4% to 64.1%
depending upon the distortion type used. Distortions which introduced noise or applied
blurring-type eects on the image had the best human success rates. Those which adjusted
contrast or scaled the image, particularly image widths, had the lowest human success rates.
Automated attack evaluation
Just as with human success rates, automated attack success rates varied greatly depend-
ing upon the distortion type used. Viola-Jones successfully solved 16.7% of undistorted
CAPTCHAs. Automated attack success rates varied from 0% to 16.7% on distorted CAPTCHAs,
with an overall average success rate of 9.3%. In general, distortions that were challenging for
human users were challenging for automated attackers and vice versa. Results for specic
distortion types are shown in Table 3.2.
While there were cases where automated attacks were unable to correctly detect the
human faces in a CAPTCHA image, the basic design of a Face Detection CAPTCHA requires
that at least one genuine human face must be present. If an automated attacker is unable
to detect any face, it may attempt to solve the CAPTCHA by guessing the location of the
genuine faces. If the guess is done completely at random, the likelihood of defeating the
CAPTCHA is remote. Assuming a CAPTCHA with ve embedded images (one to four of
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Table 3.2: Human and automated attack success rates by distortion type for all intensity
levels [148]
Distortion Used Human Success Attack Success
No distortion 82.5% 16.7%
Periodic noise 81.4% 14.3%
Resolution modication 80.3% 15.1%
Erosion 79.5% 16.7%
Rotation 79.4% 1.6%
Blurring 79.0% 16.7%
Speckle noise 79.0% 13.1%
Piecewise scaling 77.4% 7.1%
Closing 75.9% 11.9%
Height scaling 75.4% 0.0%
Lighten 68.7% 9.5%
Laplacian ltering 66.3% 0.0%
Width scaling 64.1% 0.0%
Overall 71.8% 9.3%
which are genuine faces) and an average face bounding box size of 48  51 pixels as in the
test CAPTCHAs, the average chance of a correct guess is 4-in-1000:

1
4
 4X
i=1
 
iY
j=1
(48 51)j
(500 300)  (i  j)
!
= 0:422% (3.6)
Comparing success rates to image quality metrics
To better understand the relationship between distortions, human success rates, and auto-
mated attack success rates, the structural similarity (SSIM) [155] and visual information
delity (VIF) [156] image quality metrics were used to compare distorted and undistorted
versions of each CAPTCHA. These metrics are patterned after the human visual system
and objectively measure dierences between images. Both metrics yield values in the range
[0; 1], where values closer to 1 represent images that are more visually similar. As shown
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in Table 3.3, there is a correlation (r = 0:48) between average human success rates and
average SSIM values for each distortion type. There is also a correlation (r = 0:88) between
average automated attack success rates and average VIF values as shown in Table 3.4. These
relationships suggest the SSIM and VIF metrics are useful in predicting human and auto-
mated attacker performance in solving CAPTCHAs. This information can be leveraged to
adjust CAPTCHA generation settings in future implementations to create better-performing
CAPTCHAs.
Table 3.3: Comparison of human success rates and SSIM values [148]
Distortion Used
Human
Rank
SSIM Rank
Human
Success
SSIM Value
Periodic noise 1 8 81.4% 0.8161
Resolution
modication
2 2 80.3% 0.9608
Erosion 3 4 79.5% 0.9303
Rotation 4 11 79.4% 0.7468
Blurring 5 3 79.0% 0.9403
Speckle noise 6 5 79.0% 0.9146
Piecewise scaling 7 8 77.4% 0.7609
Closing 8 1 75.9% 0.9677
Height scaling 9 9 75.4% 0.7540
Lighten 10 6 68.7% 0.8556
Laplacian ltering 11 12 66.3% 0.7293
Width scaling 12 10 64.0% 0.7526
Considerations for future implementations
Experimental results show that several factors must be taken into consideration when imple-
menting CAPTCHAs to ensure an optimal balance between human and automated attack
success rates. One of the most critical choices is selecting the embedded genuine face im-
ages. Attention should be given to the pose, size, illumination, and facial expression of the
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Table 3.4: Comparison of automated attack success rates and VIF values [148]
Distortion Used
Attack
Rank
VIF Rank
Attack
Success
VIF Value
Erosion 1 5 16.7% 0.5799
Blurring 2 4 16.7% 0.6239
Resolution
modication
3 1 15.1% 0.7276
Periodic noise 4 6 14.3% 0.5574
Speckle noise 5 3 13.1% 0.6342
Closing 6 2 11.9% 0.7071
Lighten 7 7 9.5% 0.4983
Laplacian ltering 8 8 0.0% 0.3705
Piecewise scaling 9 9 7.1% 0.3579
Rotation 10 10 1.6% 0.3433
Height scaling 11 11 0.0% 0.3376
Width scaling 12 12 0.0% 0.3327
subject as these factors signicantly impact a human's ability to recognize the face once it
is distorted and embedded in the nal composite CAPTCHA. As an example, consider the
two images in Fig. 3.7 that were paired together in 49 dierent rendered CAPTCHAs.
Fig. 3.7a is a bust shot displaying good contrast. Humans correctly identied it as a
human face 99.0% of the time. By comparison, Fig. 3.7b is dark, has poor contrast, and
the face comprises a relatively small portion of the full image. People only identied it in
61.8% of attempts. Eort should be given to removing items similar to Fig. 3.7b that are
unlikely to perform well from the source image set, but there may be further value in using a
standardized image set such as a driver's license photograph database. Standardized images
with a neutral pose, expression, and illumination will help to ensure the eect of applying
distortions is predictable while also providing a consistent appearance for the human users
attempting to recognize the human faces. The large variation in the CMU face database
images used is reected in lowered human detection rates.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.7: The original face image can have a signicant impact on how well humans are
able to identify it once embedded [148].
The two other key parameters to ensure optimal CAPTCHA eectiveness are the distor-
tion type and distortion intensity applied to embedded images. During initial development
of Face Detection CAPTCHA, 24 dierent distortion types were considered. After reviewing
their eects when applied to images and their dierences from other distortions, only 12 were
selected for use in the nal CAPTCHA implementation. Based on the experimental results,
several observations can be made regarding the performance of dierent distortions types
and their value. Geometric distortions such as scaling and rotating images functioned best,
with noise-based distortions also of signicant benet. Mathematical morphologies such as
closing and erosion have a mixed value; they perform well for human detection but also have
above-average automated attack detection rates. Distortions impacting the contrast ratio
are of limited use due to high automated attack success rates relative to human performance.
One or more intensities must be selected for each distortion type. It is benecial to
test several dierent intensities to identify the intensities that work best with a given image
set. Depending on the underlying characteristics of the images, certain values may not be
appropriate. For instance, brightly illuminated source images that then have the lighten
distortion applied may appear completely washed out. After testing several dierent pa-
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rameter settings, it is frequently possible to divide the intensities into a few similar groups
by their relative level of eect. In the testing, the selected distortion intensities coalesced
towards high, medium, and low settings; with further evaluation, some specic intensities
were removed because they provided little dierence or resulted in unusable images.
While selecting standard distortion types and intensities to apply to all images is a viable
means of generating CAPTCHAs, as demonstrated by the results here, other options may
be better. To achieve the best possible performance, the distortion type and intensity can be
customized for each individual embedded image. The selection process may be automated by
analyzing image quality metrics. In the experiments, SSIM and VIF were used to model how
well humans and computers, respectively, could identify each image. By creating a composite
of these or other image quality metrics, one can easily compare a large number of distortion
parameters to nd those with an optimal balance between human and automated attack
detection accuracies. Similarly, embedded images can be compared to remove images likely
to perform poorly. In this way, when the CAPTCHA image is generated, we can know it has
the best possible likelihood of preventing automated attacks with minimal inconvenience to
people.
3.3 Summary
Face Detection CAPTCHA represents an initial attempt at creating an image-based CAPTCHA
using object detection as its test. While testing shows the CAPTCHA's human and auto-
mated attack success rates to be less than desirable for a publicly used CAPTCHA, the
evaluation process demonstrates the viability of the basic concept and identied factors to
improve the performance of future CAPTCHA designs.
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Chapter 4
FaceDCAPTCHA
4.1 Proposed approach
4.1.1 CAPTCHA design
Even after decades of research in face detection, challenges remain for automated algorithms
in accurately recognizing distorted or partially occluded faces in complex images. Humans,
conversely, are skilled at recognizing faces in these situations. FaceDCAPTCHA [157] lever-
ages these relative dierences as it builds upon Face Detection CAPTCHA's image-based
CAPTCHA framework.
FaceDCAPTCHA presents users with a composite color image containing four to six em-
bedded images of human faces, cartoon faces, or sketches as shown in Fig. 4.1. As with Face
Detection CAPTCHA, users solve FaceDCAPTCHA by selecting all of the embedded hu-
man face images without any mis-selections. Compared to its predecessor, FaceDCAPTCHA
oers signicant improvements that are designed to improve human success rates while re-
ducing the likelihood of successful automated attacks. These improvements include FaceD-
CAPTCHA's use of facial feature occlusions, which hide elements such as the eyes, nose,
and mouth that automated algorithms use to detect faces. FaceDCAPTCHA also employs a
gradient descent optimization process to select distortion types and intensities enabling the
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highest success rates for human users. These improvements result in a 15-point increase in
human success rates while reducing automated attack success rates to nearly zero.
Figure 4.1: Sample FaceDCAPTCHA image with correct answers circled in red.
4.1.2 Generation process
The FaceDCAPTCHA generation process can be written as:
C = F (; Igenuine; Ifake) (4.1)
where function F represents a series of image processing operations applied using a set of
distortion parameters, , and source images, Igenuine and Ifake, to generate FaceDCAPTCHA
image C. The set of parameters is used to control the diculty of the generated CAPTCHA.
FaceDCAPTCHA uses an adversarial learning approach and gradient descent optimiza-
tion learning to learn the optimal set of parameters that maximize the human success
rate at solving the CAPTCHA while minimizing the automated attack success rate. The
FaceDCAPTCHA generation process can be divided into two phases: (1) creation of and
performance collection using training CAPTCHAs, and (2) generation of the nal FaceD-
CAPTCHA images using optimized parameters.
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4.1.3 CAPTCHA generation parameters
Several CAPTCHA generation parameters in  are chosen using results from an adversarial
learning process:
 Variable ntotal determines the total number of embedded images, including both genuine
and fake faces. Genuine faces are images of real humans collected from dierent publicly
available face databases. Fake faces are images of cartoons and other objects known
to generate false positives by automatic face detection algorithms.
 The number of genuine face images in a CAPTCHA, ngenuine, is the second parameter.
In a given CAPTCHA,
ntotal =
n
ngenuine + nfake
 ngenuine  2; nfake  1; ntotal = f5; 6go (4.2)
where nfake is the number of fake images. For a given CAPTCHA, only ntotal and
ngenuine must be dened.
 The CAPTCHA background, controlled by parameter set B, is important in providing
randomness to confuse automatic face detection algorithms. This parameter set spec-
ies settings such as the number of background shapes to be generated (nshapes), the
number of dilation operations to be performed (ndilations), and the number of random
portions to be placed (nportions).
 The (x; y) location of each embedded image is an important factor. With random
locations, segmentation is more dicult than if a xed location scheme is used.
 Parameter set D species settings for the ve types of distortion operations that can be
applied to the CAPTCHA. The distortion types available include stripes, strikeouts,
rotation, background blending, and noise addition.
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Figure 4.2: Steps involved in generating FaceDCAPTCHA images [157]. Human face and
fake distractor images are selected and then visually distorted. They are placed on a complex
multicolored background. Once all images have been placed, additional noise is added to the
image, yielding the nal FaceDCAPTCHA image.
FaceDCAPTCHA's gradient descent optimization process uses results from human users
and automated attack adversaries attempting to solve training CAPTCHAs to nd optimal
values for the  generation parameters. Training images were generated using values from
17 predetermined sets covering a wide range of possible values.
Both training and nal FaceDCAPTCHA images are generated using the process shown
in Fig. 4.2. It is described below.
Image selection
Once the generation parameters are determined, creation of the CAPTCHA image begins
by selecting ngenuine and nfake images from sets Igenuine and Ifake, respectively.
Background generation
Once the embedded images are selected, the generation of the 400  300-pixel background
image begins using the following two approaches depending upon the specied values of
nshapes and nportions:
 Random Colors: When nportions = 0, the background image is created using shapes such
as circles, squares, and crosses with randomly chosen sizes and colors. These shapes are
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pasted on the canvas at random coordinates to generate the nal background image.
This background image is then dilated ndilations times before genuine and fake images
are embedded to blur the edges of the shapes and confuse edge detection-based attack
algorithms. Fig. 4.3a shows a sample background generated using this approach.
 Random Portions: When nportions > 0, portions of the selected genuine embedded
images are incorporated into the background. After generating an initial background
image using the Random Colors algorithm, skin tone-colored sections of the genuine
images to be embedded are randomly selected. These skin tone portions are placed
on the background at random coordinates to help fool skin color-based face detection
algorithms. Fig. 4.3b shows a sample background generated using this approach.
(a) Random Colors approach (b) Random Portions approach
Figure 4.3: Backgrounds generated using the Random Colors and Random Portions ap-
proaches [157].
Image-level distortion application
Each genuine and fake image to be embedded is processed using the distortion parameters
specied by D:
 Stripes are applied on some genuine and fake embedded images. This operation is
not necessarily applied uniformly to all embedded images. A total of D1N stripes are
51
applied, with the stripes being D1W pixels in width, where 3 D1W  6. An example
of this operation is shown in Fig. 4.4a.
 The strikeout operation, shown in Fig. 4.4b, is used to occlude key facial features such
as the eyes, mouth, and/or nose. The transparency parameter, D2 , is set so that human
users can visualize the facial features but it is challenging for adversaries.
 The rotation operation [158] is used to rotate genuine and fake images with a  angle
as shown in Fig. 4.4c. D3 contains the  angles for each embedded image.
 The blending operation [159] is used to smoothly blend the embedded genuine and fake
images into the background as shown in Fig. 4.4d. In this operation, parameter D4 is
to determine the degree of blending.
(a) Stripes (b) Strikeout
(c) Rotation (d) Background blending
Figure 4.4: Eects of distortion operations on embedded images [157].
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Image placement
Once each embedded image has been distorted, they are placed at randomly selected locations
(x; y) on the CAPTCHA background B. The embedded images are positioned to avoid
overlaps with the edge of the CAPTCHA and with each other.
Global noise distortion application
Once the embedded images have been placed on background B, noise-based distortions are
applied to the entire CAPTCHA. The parameter ntype determines if additive, multiplica-
tive, or salt-and-pepper noise is to be added. nmin and nmax determine the minimum and
maximum percentage of pixels to be aected by the noise operation.
CAPTCHA parameter training
Training CAPTCHAs generated using predetermined parameter value sets are used to learn
which parameter sets result in CAPTCHAs that are readily solvable by humans but not by
automated attack adversaries. These useful parameter sets, u, are learned using:
u = Train(C=F (i;Igenuine;Ifake))(H = 1; Ad = 0) (4.3)
where H is the human response and Ad is the adversary response to solving the CAPTCHA.
Here, H = 1 represents the correct human response and Ad = 0 represents the incorrect
response of the adversary. There can be several available parameters, i; however, only those
parameters (u) satisfying the condition given in Eq. 4.3 are selected. Parameters associated
with other conditions, i.e., (H = 1; Ad = 1); (H = 0; Ad = 1), and (H = 0; Ad = 0), are not
useful. Train represents parameter learning in a gradient descent manner. Let EH;Ad(t) be
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the objective or error function that minimizes the error caused by four conditions associated
with H and Ad:
EH;Ad(t) =
8>><>>:
0 if H = 1 and Ad = 0
1 otherwise.
(4.4)
In gradient descent optimization, optimal parameters are obtained using Eqs. 4.5 and 4.6:
5EH;Ad(t) = @EH;Ad(t)
@
(4.5)
t+1 = t   5 EH;Ad(t) (4.6)
Here, 5EH;Ad(t) represents the gradient of the error function at the tth learning iteration
and  is the learning rate that controls the convergence of parameter learning. This learning
procedure involves determining the human response (H) as well as the adversarial response
for the automatic face detection algorithm (Ad); it converges to the case where humans can
solve the CAPTCHA but the adversarial algorithm cannot.
Human responses were gathered from users attempting to complete the generated train-
ing CAPTCHAs. The Viola-Jones face detector [153], Picasa [160], and a commercial o-
the-shelf face detection system (COTS) provided adversarial responses using the following
methodology:
1. For each CAPTCHA image C, the Viola-Jones face detector [153] is rst used to
perform face detection.
2. The detected face coordinates are matched with the actual embedded genuine face
photograph locations.
3. If all embedded faces in C were found, the face detector's adversarial response is
considered correct. Otherwise, it is considered incorrect.
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4. Steps 2 through 4 are repeated using Picasa in place of the Viola-Jones face detector,
and then again with a COTS face detection solution to locate embedded genuine face
images.
Final CAPTCHA generation using optimized parameters
Once the gradient descent optimization process is completed, the nal FaceDCAPTCHA
images are generated using the 10 best-performing optimized parameter sets as determined
by Eq. 4.6. These CAPTCHAs are created using the same generation process described
earlier in this section as is used for the training CAPTCHAs. Fig. 4.5 shows several examples
of the nal optimized FaceDCAPTCHA images.
Figure 4.5: Samples of optimized FaceDCAPTCHA images [157].
4.2 Experimental results and analysis
FaceDCAPTCHA was tested by over 1,300 participants. This section describes the source
images used to generate the CAPTCHA, experimental protocol, and key results.
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4.2.1 Image databases
The embedded images used in FaceDCAPTCHA were sourced from publicly available online
images. Approximately 1,800 genuine human face images were chosen from the LFW face
database [161] and about 300 fake non-face images were taken from cartoons posted on
Photobucket [162]. The fake images were selected because they resulted in false positives
when analyzed by the Viola-Jones face detection algorithm [153]. Sixty percent of the source
images were used in generating training images; the remaining source images were used in
generating the nal optimized test CAPTCHAs.
4.2.2 Participants and testing protocol
To evaluate human accuracy in solving FaceDCAPTCHA images, over 1,300 participants
attempted to access a website protected by a CAPTCHA. Users were unsupervised and
allowed to access the website using a browser and computing device of their choice. They
were asked to continue attempting to solve CAPTCHAs until they succeeded. Results were
initially gathered on 5,300 training CAPTCHAs, and once the gradient descent optimization
process was complete, the 500 nal optimized CAPTCHAs were also tested.
Automated attacks against FaceDCAPTCHA nal optimized images were simulated us-
ing the Viola-Jones algorithm [153], Picasa [160], and a commercial o-the-shelf face de-
tection solution. A superset of 17,000 CAPTCHAs were evaluated by automated attackers
during the training phase. The same 500 optimized CAPTCHAs as with human users were
evaluated for nal results.
4.2.3 Analysis
Training results
Of the 11,000 attempts at solving training FaceDCAPTCHA images, the overall human
success rate was 66.8%. Human success rates for the various training sets varied from 64%
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to 86%, with training sets having more distorted images receiving lower human success
rates. Many human users had diculty in distinguishing between human and cartoon faces,
especially once distortions were applied. Facial feature occlusions were most problematic;
the black stripes placed across some images greatly hindered recognition. As more bars were
placed, covering a larger area of the CAPTCHA, people were less likely to correctly identify
the image. Based on this nding, life-like cartoon images such as those in Fig. 4.6 were
removed from the source image database used in generating the nal optimized CAPTCHAs.
Figure 4.6: Samples of embedded images that are removed after the training process [157].
Adversaries were able to solve 0.2% of training CAPTCHAs. Just as with human users,
there was an inverse relationship between the intensity of applied distortions and success
rates; lightly distorted CAPTCHAs were more likely to be solved than heavily distorted im-
ages. The training results revealed that several distortion types, including blurring, dilation,
erosion, and warping eects, reduced automated attack rates by less than 50%. As a result,
these less eective distortions were not used in generating the nal optimized images.
Human performance evaluation
A total of 9,948 attempts were recorded by 1,025 human users on the nal optimized FaceD-
CAPTCHA images. Results were markedly improved compared to the training phase, with
an overall human success rate of 86.6%. This nearly 7-in-8 success rate compares favorably
to the 75% and 80% success rates of major commercial CAPTCHAs, such as reCAPTCHA
and MSN [22]. Table 4.1 shows results by distortion type.
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Table 4.1: Final FaceDCAPTCHA success rates by distortion type
Distortions Used Human Success Attack Success
Blending, noise, rotation 90.3% 0.0%
Blending, noise, rotation, strikeouts 86.6% 0.0%
Blending, noise, rotation, strikeouts, stripes 84.3% 0.0%
Blending, noise, rotation, stripes 86.0% 0.0%
Noise, rotation 97.6% 0.0%
Noise, rotation, strikeouts 87.8% 0.0%
Noise, rotation, strikeouts, stripes 85.8% 0.0%
Noise, rotation, stripes 86.9% 0.0%
Overall 86.6% 0.0%
One major source of improved human performance in the nal images was a reduction
in the amount of background blending applied. In the training set, where embedded images
were more heavily blended into their background, it was frequently challenging for users to
distinguish between genuine and fake facial features. When blending is reduced, as in the
nal optimized image set, subtle dierences are more obvious to human users. Limiting the
use of facial feature occlusions, and making occlusions more transparent when they were
used, also provided humans with more data to use in distinguishing between image types.
Automated attack evaluation
Picasa and the commercial o-the-shelf face detector were unable to locate any embedded
genuine human faces among the nal optimized CAPTCHAs. Viola-Jones detected one face
each in two CAPTCHAs, but false faces were also detected so its attempts at solving the
CAPTCHAs were not successful.
FaceDCAPTCHA was also tested using Zhu's [98] automated attack approach which
has been used against the IMAGINATION and ARTiFACIAL CAPTCHAs with 74% and
18% success rates, respectively. The same approach was unable to solve any of the nal
FaceDCAPTCHA images.
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Brute force attacks based on randomly guessing the locations of embedded human faces
are similarly unlikely to succeed. Each FaceDCAPTCHA image contains two to four genuine
human faces. Each face is approximately 80  80 pixels in size, with an overall CAPTCHA
image size of 400  300 pixels. Thus, the average chance of a single brute force attempt at
correctly solving FaceDCAPTCHA is slight:

1
3
 4X
i=2
 
iY
j=1
(80 80)j
(400 300)  (i  j)
!
= 0:2264% (4.7)
Since a new image is chosen at random from a large set each time FaceDCAPTCHA is
presented, a would-be attacker would likely have to wait hundreds of times before seeing the
same image again if their attempt is unsuccessful. This dramatically slows the process of
attacking FaceDCAPTCHA. In testing with a random guess-based breaking algorithm on
an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.2GHz processor, none of the 500 tested CAPTCHAs were successfully
broken after over 15 hours of execution.
4.3 Summary
Through its use of a gradient descent-based training-testing process, FaceDCAPTCHA gen-
erates face detected-based CAPTCHA images with distortions optimized to improve the
CAPTCHA's performance. Compared to its predecessor, Face Detection CAPTCHA, FaceD-
CAPTCHA has signicantly improved human success rates (from 71.8% to 86.6%) and also
nearly eliminated the likelihood of successful automated attacks. These improvements do
come at a cost, however, with signicant training, both manual and automatic, being re-
quired to generate these optimized images.
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Chapter 5
fgCAPTCHA
5.1 Proposed approach
5.1.1 CAPTCHA design
fgCAPTCHA [163] builds upon the improved performance of FaceDCAPTCHA by fully
automating the process of generating face detection-based CAPTCHA images. As with
its predecessors, fgCAPTCHA requires users to select, without error, all genuine human
face photographs embedded in a visually distorted composite image. Cartoons, sketches,
and photographs of non-human animals are also present to serve as fake distractor images.
Fig. 5.1 shows an example of a correctly solved fgCAPTCHA test.
While FaceDCAPTCHA's gradient descent optimization process provides signicantly
improved human success and automated attack success rates compared to the original Face
Detection CAPTCHA, its use of \human in the loop" training to optimize the applied dis-
tortions is impractical. It is dicult to nd a suciently large number of human participants
to provide optimization training data in a closed setting. Public use of unoptimized training
images is undesirable since these images are less likely to be readily solvable by humans
and more likely to be vulnerable to automated attack. fgCAPTCHA addresses these short-
comings by using a genetic learning algorithm to fully automate the distortion optimization
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Figure 5.1: Sample fgCAPTCHA image with correct answers circled in red [163].
process; only images which have been optimized to provide high human success rates and
ensure low automated attack rates are publicly used. fgCAPTCHA also improves upon
FaceDCAPTCHA's process by optimizing applied distortions on a per-image basis, rather
than on a source image set basis. This yields ner-grained settings along with the potential
for further improved human success rates.
5.1.2 Generation process
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Figure 5.2: Steps involved in generating fgCAPTCHA images [163]. A complex background is
rst generated and face and non-face images are selected to be embedded. A genetic learning
algorithm then begins an optimization process to generate and evaluate test CAPTCHAs to
determine the distortion settings that yield the best performing CAPTCHAs. These settings
are then used to generate the nal fgCAPTCHA image.
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Generation of fgCAPTCHA images is a multi-step process as shown in Fig. 5.2. It involves
several distinct phases: complex background generation, genuine face and fake non-face
image selection, distortion type selection, and genetic learning algorithm-based distortion
optimization. The generation process can be represented as:
C = F (nmin; nmax; ; Igenuine; Ifake) (5.1)
where function F creates a new CAPTCHA containing a total of between nmin and nmax
embedded images taken from sets Igenuine and Ifake. Distortion settings (distortion types
and distortion intensities) selected from  are applied to the rendered composite, yielding
CAPTCHA C. The goal of the CAPTCHA generation process is to nd distortion settings
that maximize the chance that humans will be able to solve the CAPTCHA while minimizing
the likelihood of successful automated attacks by computer algorithms. This can be shown
as:
argmax' P (C') = PH(C')  PA(C') (5.2)
where C' is a CAPTCHA with distortion settings ' applied, PH is the likelihood humans
can solve the CAPTCHA, PA is the likelihood automated attacks can solve the CAPTCHA,
and P is the dierence between the two likelihoods.
Without including humans in the loop during the CAPTCHA generation process, it
is impossible to know the actual values of PH and P for a given CAPTCHA. Instead, a
simulation process is used to model human performance. The results of the simulation are
used to calculate a tness value for each generated CAPTCHA:
V (C') = SH (C')  SA (C') (5.3)
where SH is the simulated likelihood of human success, SA is the likelihood of a successful
automated attack, and tness value V is the dierence between the two likelihoods. Higher
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values of V indicate a CAPTCHA where it should be relatively easier for humans to detect
the faces while being more dicult for automated attackers to successfully complete the
face detection task. These attacks can be modeled by performing automated face detection
and comparing detected face locations against known face locations. fgCAPTCHA uses the
Viola-Jones algorithm [153] to locate embedded faces. The face locations indicated by the
algorithm are compared against the actual embedded genuine human face locations, with the
automated attack rate being the percentage of genuine human faces that are found. Lower
values resulting from Eq. 5.4 are better:
SA (C') =
dcorrect   dfalse
n
 1:0 (5.4)
where n is the number of embedded human faces in CAPTCHA image C with distortion '
applied, dcorrect is the number of human faces correctly detected by the algorithm, and dfalse
is the number of false human face detections.
Since there is no direct way of simulating human performance, fgCAPTCHA indirectly
models human success rates using image quality metrics. The Structural Similarity (SSIM)
model, a metric designed to mimic the human visual system, compares distorted and undis-
torted versions of embedded images to look for dierences in linear correlation, luminance,
and contrast [164]. To model human performance, SSIM is performed on each embedded
image. Values closer to 1.0 signify that the tested images are more similar and, hopefully,
the distorted version will then be relatively easier for humans to solve. The modeled human
success rate is an average of all SSIM values:
SH (C') =
Pn
j=0 SSIM (Cj')
n
 1:0 (5.5)
where n is the number of genuine human faces embedded in CAPTCHA image C and
SSIM (Cj') is the resulting SSIM value when distortion settings ' are applied to the em-
bedded image j.
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Background generation
The creation of a new fgCAPTCHA image begins with the generation of a 400  300 pixel
background composed of many overlapping rectangles in various colors and sizes. The indi-
vidual colored rectangles have their colors chosen at random from a list of 56 common hues,
including skin tones. Height and width are based on a fraction of the overall image size,
randomly scaled, so that:
s =
n r
10
min(height; width)
0:75  r  1:25o (5.6)
where s is the resulting size in pixels for one side of the rectangle, height and width are the
overall height and width of the background, and r is a random real-valued scaling factor.
Colored rectangles are scattered across the entire background until at least 95% is covered.
This provides a complex pattern to interfere with the rectangular features used by the Viola-
Jones detector and other similar face detection algorithms. The random sizes and colors make
it dicult to isolate embedded images, and in some cases, lead algorithms to falsely detect
faces in the background.
Image selection
Once the background is generated, a total of four to ve genuine face and fake non-face
distractor images are selected to be embedded:
ntotal =
n
ngenuine + nfake
 ngenuine  2; nfake  1; ntotal = f4; 5go (5.7)
Here ngenuine, nfake, and ntotal represent the number of embedded genuine faces, fake
non-faces, and total images, respectively. At least two genuine face images are present to
prevent a single guess from successfully solving the CAPTCHA and at least one image is a
non-face image to provide a false target in case attackers can detect the location of embedded
images. Each embedded image is scaled to approximately 100100 pixels prior to placement.
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This size corresponds with the area covered by a ngertip for accurate use on touchscreen
devices. The images are placed at randomly selected coordinates within the background,
ensuring that the images do not overlap with each other or the outside boundary of the
CAPTCHA. An example of a preliminary CAPTCHA with embedded images appears in
Fig. 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Example of a new undistorted fgCAPTCHA [163].
Distortion selection
The distortions applied to each CAPTCHA have a signicant impact on human and auto-
mated attack success rates. During design, 10 distortion types were identied that yield the
best performance. Each distortion type has a range of possible intensities adjusted by the
various parameters shown in Table 5.1.
In this step, the various distortion types are compared to nd the types that provide
the best performance when applied to the intended CAPTCHA. Each distortion type is ap-
plied at eight dierent intensities evenly spread over its range. Performance or tness values
are calculated for each of the resulting images using Eq. 5.3. The results are ranked by
their tness, with those distortion types yielding the top 50% most-t CAPTCHAs selected
for further use. A Cartesian product is created combining two each of the best-t distor-
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Table 5.1: fgCAPTCHA distortion types [163]
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Distortion
Type
Class Applied
Parameters
Adjusted
Intensity
Range
Erosion Degradation Globally Pixel radius 3.0-3.5
Lighten Degradation Globally
Scale histogram
range
0.30-0.45
Resolution
modication
Degradation Locally Scale factor 1:3.5-1:5
Width scaling Geometric Locally Scale factor 1.5-4.0
Height scaling Geometric Locally Scale factor 1.5-3.0
Rotation Geometric Locally
Degrees of
rotation
60-180
Piecewise scaling Geometric Locally Scale factor 1.5-3.5
Periodic noise Noise Globally
% of image
removed
5-7.5
Salt-and-pepper
noise
Noise Globally
% of pixels to
replace
10-20
Speckle noise Noise Locally Variance 2-5
tion types. Experience has shown that applying two distortion types to each CAPTCHA
represents a good balance between making images too simple for automated attacks (one
distortion type) or too hard for human users (three or more distortion types). Some distor-
tion type pairs known to perform poorly are discarded, with the rest continued to the next
distortion optimization step.
The distortion types can be classied into three categories: geometric, noise-based, and
degradation distortions. Geometric distortions alter the shape, size, or position of embedded
images. Width and height scaling change the dimensions of an image. Piecewise scaling
leaves the overall dimensions of the image untouched but changes the relative proportions
of sections of the image. For example, the left half of an image might be compressed to take
up 50% less space than before while the right half is stretched to ll the available space.
The rotation distortion rotates the image around a center axis. Any portion of the image
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falling outside the original dimensions is removed. Rotation can be performed using the
transformation matrix [158]:
264 x0
y0
375 =
264 cos(')   sin (')
sin(') cos(')
375
264 x
y
375 (5.8)
Here, (x; y) are the original coordinates of a pixel, ' is the degree of rotation to be applied
in radians, and (x0; y0) are the adjusted coordinates of the pixel.
Noise-based distortions add interference not present in the original image. Salt-and-
pepper noise changes the values of the specied percentage of pixels to the maximum or
minimum possible value, thus having the eect of adding randomly discolored pixels to the
overall CAPTCHA. Speckle noise modies the values of individual pixels in a pattern that is
uniformly distributed with a mean of 0 and a variance specied by the distortion intensity.
Periodic noise creates a repeating pattern of darkened bars across the entire image. It can
be generated by [165]:
vd(x; y) = max
 
0;min
 
v(x; y) + (sin(y+1
'
)  255)
2
; 255
!!
(5.9)
where v(x; y) is the original pixel value, a number between 0 and 255, at coordinates (x; y).
vd(x; y) is the distorted pixel value and ' is the distortion intensity.
Degradation distortions are designed to reduce detail or contrast, making it dicult to
nd the embedded images. The lighten distortion increases the luminance of each pixel by
a specied percentage, eectively reducing the contrast of a CAPTCHA. Erosion works on
the entire CAPTCHA in successive blocks. It compares the values of each pixel with those
of its neighbors and eliminates unique values, reducing ne detail.
Resolution modication is performed as a pair of bilinear resizing operations, the rst
reducing the size of the image and the second expanding it to its original size. As pixel data
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is lost, a blocky-looking image emerges. The bilinear resizing operation can be represented
using [159]:
v(x0; y0) = ax0 + by0 + cx0y0 + d (5.10)
where v(x0; y0) is the pixel value of coordinates (x0; y0) and coecients a; b; c; d can be solved
using four equations in four unknowns for the four neighbors of (x0; y0).
Distortion optimization
Once the distortion type pairs have been determined, optimal intensities for each distortion
must be found. This is a complex problem with a huge search space; therefore, brute force
exploration is not feasible. fgCAPTCHA instead uses a genetic learning algorithm (GA) to
eciently identify optimal distortion settings. Genetic algorithms are modeled on the biolog-
ical process of evolution [166]. They work by producing successive generations of candidate
solutions, referred to as chromosomes, to nd the distortion settings that generate the opti-
mized CAPTCHA. The algorithm includes several steps (input parameters are summarized
in Table 5.2) as described below.
Step 1: Generate Initial Chromosomes - The algorithm begins by generating an initial set
of 150 chromosomes, each representing one possible combination of distortion settings. The
chromosomes contain two genes, each encoding a single distortion type and its associated
real-valued intensity. Distortion types are selected from the list of approved distortion type
pairs and their intensities are randomly set to a value within the distortion type's specied
range. After the chromosomes are generated, a tness value is calculated for each using
Eq. 5.3. Since each distortion type has a distinct range of intensities, genetic algorithm
operations such as crossover must be performed only between chromosomes with the same
distortion types. Thus, the chromosomes are organized into groups based on their distortion
types as shown in Fig. 5.4. To ensure genetic diversity within each group, a minimum of two
chromosomes per group is maintained.
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Figure 5.4: Example of chromosome groups [163].
Step 2: Select Candidates for Next Generation - A roulette wheel-based process is used
to select chromosomes to create the next generation. The process selects chromosomes at a
rate proportional to their tness [167]:
pi =
iPn
i=0 i
(5.11)
where n is the total number of chromosomes, i is the tness of chromosome i, and pi is the
probability chromosome i will be selected. Roulette wheel selection works by rst summing
the tness values of all chromosomes, yielding T . Then, for each chromosome, a random
value , between 0 and T , is selected. The list of chromosomes is iterated through, adding
their tness values, until the sum is greater than or equal to . The chromosome whose
tness value brings the sum over  is selected to create the next generation [167].
Step 3: Perform Crossover - In the crossover step, the values from two parent chro-
mosomes are used to produce two child chromosomes. Approximately 80% of parent chro-
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mosomes are randomly selected to participate in this process. A variation on single-point
crossover, shown in Fig. 5.5, is used to accommodate the real-valued distortion intensities
stored in the genes. As with single-point crossover, prior to the crossover point, child chro-
mosomes K1; K2 inherit directly from their parent chromosomes J1; J2 so that for a given
gene x on each chromosome, K1x = J1x and K2x = J2x. After the crossover point, a
weighted combination of the two parent chromosomes is used to simulate the value changes
that would occur with a binary string representation in traditional single-point crossover.
Here, K1x =
1
4
J1x +
3
4
J2x; K2x =
1
4
J2x +
3
4
J1x for gene x.
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Figure 5.5: Demonstration of crossover process between parent chromosomes J1 and J2 to
create child chromosomes K1 and K2 [163]. The crossover point is between genes 1 and 2.
Step 4: Conduct Mutation - To prevent stagnation of results at local optima, mutation is
applied to approximately 5% of gene values. This helps to ensure the entire solution space
is searched rather than just values near those of the parent chromosomes. The traditional
mutation approach of randomly ipping bits in a binary-encoded gene value does not work
with real-valued genes. Instead, the existing gene value is averaged with a new random value
when mutation is performed:
m =

c+ n
2
distmin  n  distmax (5.12)
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where c is the existing value of the gene, n is a random real-valued number between the
distmin and distmax minimum and maximum intensity values allowed for the distortion, and
m is the mutated gene value.
Step 5: Run Replacement - Once a new generation of chromosomes has been created, an
 + -update replacement process is used to select the chromosomes that will be retained.
This method keeps the chromosomes with the best tness values from both the parent and
child generations, thereby preserving good chromosomes from the parent generation that
might otherwise be lost with a traditional generational replacement.
Step 6: Evaluate Termination Criteria - Once replacement has occurred, the tness values
for all chromosomes are compared. The best tness value is recorded for each generation.
The genetic learning algorithm can terminate if enough generations have been run or if the
best tness value stagnates. Otherwise, operation of the genetic learning algorithm continues
and the chromosomes resulting from the replacement process are provided as input to the
selection step to create a new generation. Actions are determined by:
Action =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Complete if g  100
Complete if g  50 and bestg  1:01  bestg 5
Continue otherwise
(5.13)
Here, g is the number of the current generation and bestg is the best tness value for
generation g.
Step 7: Completion - The genetic learning process stops once the termination criteria
have been satised. To ensure that any readily attackable images do not see public use,
any CAPTCHAs with computer-based attack success rates of SA = 1:0 are discarded. The
remaining CAPTCHAs with the best tness values are recorded along with their embedded
image coordinates so they can be used as tests. Examples of generated CAPTCHAs presented
to users are shown in Fig. 5.6.
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Table 5.2: fgCAPTCHA genetic algorithm details [163]
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Parameter Type or Value
Initial Chromosomes 150
Selection Method Roulette Wheel
Crossover Rate 80%
Crossover Method Modied Single-Point
Mutation Rate 5%
Replacement Method + -update
Termination Criteria Stagnation or Maximum Generations
Stagnation Condition Minimum 50 generations, then less than 1% change
in best tness over 5 generations
Maximum Generations 100
5.2 Experimental results and analysis
This section provides the details of image databases used, participants, and protocol followed
for designing and evaluating the performance of fgCAPTCHA along with the results and
analysis.
5.2.1 Image databases
fgCAPTCHA uses publicly available photographs from the LFW face database [161] for the
genuine human face images. Cartoons and high-quality sketches from Photobucket [162]
comprise the fake non-face images used in the CAPTCHA.
5.2.2 Participants and testing protocol
Evaluation of fgCAPTCHA was conducted with the help of 2,600 participants. Users were
unsupervised and asked to access a website protected by fgCAPTCHA using a browser and
computing device of their choice. For each attempt, one CAPTCHA was presented at a
time. Users were asked to continue solving CAPTCHAs until they were successful.
72
c 
2
0
1
4
IE
E
E
Figure 5.6: Samples of generated fgCAPTCHA images [163].
An additional 17 users participated in detailed mobile device testing using a combination
of tablets and smartphones. These users compared fgCAPTCHA with two other popular
CAPTCHAs, namely text-based reCAPTCHA [81] and image-based IMAGINATION [97].
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Their success rates were recorded, and the users also provided a ranking of the CAPTCHAs
by their ease of use.
Automated attack testing was performed using the Viola-Jones face detection algorithm
[153] and two commercial o-the-shelf (COTS) face detection packages. The faces detected
by software were compared to the actual face locations. If any portion of the detected face
overlapped an actual face, the face was considered to be correctly found. An automated
attack was considered successful if all human faces in a CAPTCHA were found without any
false detections.
5.2.3 Analysis
Human performance evaluation
To collect data and evaluate the eectiveness of fgCAPTCHA, over 40,000 attempts by over
2,600 users were recorded on the set of 750 rendered CAPTCHAs. The human success of
solving fgCAPTCHA is dependent on the complexity and level of distortions applied using
genetic learning. With simple distortions such as rotation and height scaling, the human
success rate was 97%; but complex distortions such as resolution modication and adding
noise aect the performance signicantly. In the experiments, average human performance
across all variations was 87.9%. Detailed results are summarized in Table 5.3. From these
results, we can infer that, in general, geometric distortions such as height scaling and rotation
yield higher human success rates. These distortions do not fundamentally alter the appear-
ance of images; they only resize or reposition facial features, allowing human users to easily
detect the embedded faces. Noise-based distortions yield similar performance. Degradation
distortions result in lower accuracies as, in some cases, they destroy the ne details needed
to distinguish images. This eect is pronounced when sketches are used for non-face images.
When degradation distortions are used, humans have signicant diculty in distinguishing
between human face photographs and non-real face sketches.
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Table 5.3: fgCAPTCHA success rates for distortion type pairs [163]
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Distortions Used Human Success Attack Success
Rotation, height scaling 97.0% 0.0%
Lighten, salt-and-pepper noise 92.9% 0.0%
Erosion, salt-and-pepper noise 92.6% 0.0%
Rotation, speckle noise 91.7% 0.0%
Height scaling, width scaling 91.4% 0.0%
Rotation, width scaling 89.9% 0.0%
Piecewise scaling, width scaling 88.7% 0.0%
Rotation, salt-and-pepper noise 88.5% 0.0%
Lighten, speckle noise 88.2% 0.0%
Lighten, rotation 88.1% 0.0%
Piecewise scaling, salt-and-pepper noise 87.6% 0.0%
Salt-and-pepper noise, height scaling 87.3% 0.0%
Piecewise scaling, height scaling 85.8% 0.0%
Salt-and-pepper noise, width scaling 85.8% 0.0%
Resolution modication, height scaling 85.1% 0.0%
Lighten, resolution modication 83.3% 0.0%
Salt-and-pepper noise, speckle noise 83.3% 0.0%
Periodic noise, width scaling 81.3% 0.0%
Lighten, width scaling 81.1% 0.0%
Erosion, resolution modication 81.0% 0.0%
Lighten, height scaling 81.0% 0.0%
Resolution modication, salt-and-pepper
noise
80.0% 0.0%
Overall 87.9% 0.0%
Additionally, 17 participants evaluated fgCAPTCHA along with two other popular CAPTCHAs,
reCAPTCHA and IMAGINATION, on mobile devices using a combination of tablets and
smartphones. In this evaluation, fgCAPTCHA achieved the best mobile device human
success rate with 88.2% accuracy. Seventy percent of test participants indicated that fg-
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CAPTCHA was easiest to use, with several individuals commenting that it could be com-
pleted quicker than other CAPTCHAs. Participants specically appreciated the touch-
friendly nature of fgCAPTCHA that allowed it to be solved with just a few taps to the
screen. Fig. 5.7 illustrates these comparisons along with automated attack success rates.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of CAPTCHAs [163] when tested by humans on mobile devices,
contrasted with automated attack success rates [56, 98].
Automated attack evaluation
In the automated attack evaluation, none of the three face detection algorithms were able
to correctly solve any of the tested CAPTCHA images. In cases where the algorithms were
able to detect some human face images, other faces were either missed or falsely detected.
This is expected since the widely-used Viola-Jones face detector is incorporated into the
CAPTCHA generation process and CAPTCHAs where the Viola-Jones detector locates all
faces are automatically discarded.
It is unlikely that an automated brute force attack on fgCAPTCHA would be successful.
Each CAPTCHA contains two to four human face images, each being approximately 100100
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pixels in size. Including the one-in-three chance of guessing the number of embedded images,
the likelihood of one random guess at solving the CAPTCHA being accurate is approximately,

1
3
 4X
i=2
 
iY
j=1
(100 100)j
(400 300)  (i  j)
!
= 0:6173% (5.14)
Since new CAPTCHA images are presented on each attempt, attackers are unable to
use previous guesses to improve the accuracy of future attempts. Attackers must make a
new random guess each time. Thus, the eective attack success rate is 6-in-1000, thereby
signicantly enhancing security of the online environment using fgCAPTCHA.
5.3 Summary
fgCAPTCHA improves on its predecessors, FaceDCAPTCHA and Face Detection CAPTCHA,
in a number of ways:
1. By incorporating improved visual distortions that further strengthen the security of
the CAPTCHA without sacricing human ability to solve the tests.
2. By using color images and a genetic learning algorithm-based generation process that
increases human success rates while also reducing the automated attack success rates.
3. By removing the dependency on humans for distortion parameter selection and opti-
mization, making the CAPTCHA generation process highly scalable.
4. By accounting for design requirements tailored to the devices commonly used to view
the CAPTCHA. Screen size and resolution can vary signicantly even among devices
of the same type. A well-designed CAPTCHA must work eectively across the entire
spectrum of computing devices, from smartphones, where it may be the only item
on-screen, to tablets and computers, where it is part of a larger webpage.
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This combination of improvements provides a layer of security that is both eective and
user-friendly. fgCAPTCHA works eciently on both the touchscreens used by tablets and
smartphones and on traditional computers, achieving a high 88% human success rate during
evaluation while maintaining a near 0% automated attack rate. This combination of low
attack rates, high human success rates, and convenient mobile device usage oers signicant
benets over CAPTCHAs in widespread use today.
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Chapter 6
FR-CAPTCHA
6.1 Proposed approach
6.1.1 CAPTCHA design
While the face detection task used in fgCAPTCHA and the other previously described
CAPTCHAs oers a good balance between ease-of-use for legitimate human users and re-
siliency against automated attack, increasingly sophisticated face detection algorithms and
image processing techniques may eventually solve these CAPTCHAs. To address this future
risk, FR-CAPTCHA [168, 169] instead uses tests based on face recognition rather than face
detection. Face recognition is a problem that the human mind solves every day, usually
without conscious eort. Humans can recognize images with diering poses, illumination,
and facial expression like those shown in Fig. 6.1 as being of the same person [170], but
automated face recognition algorithms struggle with this task, especially when visual dis-
tortions are added to the images [171]. This disparity in performance between humans and
automated algorithms [172] when viewing visually distorted images makes face recognition
an ideal test for use in a CAPTCHA.
FR-CAPTCHA presents users with a composite color image containing visually distorted
photographs of human faces as well as cartoons, sketches, and photographs of other objects.
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Figure 6.1: Humans can easily recognize faces with dierent natural variations in pose,
expression, and illumination [169]. Automated face recognition algorithms struggle with
this task.
The embedded images include two pairs of photos where each pair shows the same person in
two dierent poses. To solve the CAPTCHA, users must select both of the photos from the
same pair (i.e., both photos of the same person) without any mis-selections. Fig. 6.2 shows
an example of a solved FR-CAPTCHA.
Figure 6.2: Sample FR-CAPTCHA image with correct answer pairs circled in red and yellow.
6.1.2 Generation process
The FR-CAPTCHA generation process can be represented as:
C = F (; Iface; Inonface) (6.1)
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Figure 6.3: Steps involved in generating FR-CAPTCHA images [169]. An image is cre-
ated using a randomly selected set of human faces and other non-face images after applying
dierent amounts of rotation to each image. A background of the same size is used gener-
ating various colored shapes. The background and image are blended together, then further
processed to add noise, illumination variance, and false edges. The resulting image is a
FR-CAPTCHA.
where function F represents a series of image processing operations applied using a set
of generation parameters, , and source images, Iface and Inonface, to generate the FR-
CAPTCHA image C. Like FaceDCAPTCHA, FR-CAPTCHA uses an adversarial learning
approach along with gradient descent optimization to learn the optimal set of parameters
that maximize the human success rate at solving the CAPTCHA while minimizing the
automated attack success rate. The FR-CAPTCHA generation process can be divided into
two phases: (1) creation of and performance collection using training CAPTCHAs, and (2)
generation of the nal FR-CAPTCHA images using optimized parameters.
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CAPTCHA generation parameters
The parameters specied in  control three aspects of generated FR-CAPTCHA images:
 The parameter set B species weights to use when blending objects in the CAPTCHA.
The weights control the diculty in distinguishing between blended foreground and
background objects.
 The sizes and colors of the shapes that comprise the background image are determined
by parameter set S.
 The parameter set D species settings for several distortion operations that are applied
to CAPTCHA images. The distortion types available include rotation and added noise.
FR-CAPTCHA's gradient descent optimization process uses results from people and
automated attack adversaries attempting to solve training CAPTCHAs to nd optimal values
for the  generation parameters. The initial parameter values used in generating the training
CAPTCHAs impact the eectiveness of the optimization process; poorly chosen values for
the training images can yield suboptimal results. To ensure the best possible results, the
training CAPTCHAs' generation parameters were determined using small scale experiments
with both humans and face recognition algorithms. The values used are shown in Table 6.1.
Both training and nal optimized FR-CAPTCHA images are generated using the multi-
step process shown in Fig. 6.3 and described below:
Image selection
Creation of an FR-CAPTCHA image begins by selecting nface face and nnonface non-face
images from sets Iface and Inonface, respectively, so that:
ntotal =
n
nface + nnonface
 nface = f4; 5; 6g; ntotal = 12o (6.2)
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Table 6.1: Parameter values used in generating FR-CAPTCHA training images [169]
Parameter Value
No rotation 0
Low rotation 0 - 60
Medium rotation 30 - 120
High rotation 45 - 170
No blend 100% foreground
Low blend 80% foreground
Medium blend 65% foreground
High blend 50% foreground
No global distortions illumination = false, false edges = false
Low global distortions either illumination or false edges
High global distortions illumination = true, false edges = true
To allow for FR-CAPTCHA's face recognition test, the face images must be selected so
that two pairs of photographs are present, where each pair includes two photographs of the
same person.
Image placement
After their selection, each image to be embedded is randomly resized to between 100  125
and 175 150 pixels. Each image is also rotated by a stochastically chosen angle within the
range [DRmin; DRmax].
Each embedded image is placed at a randomly selected location within the boundaries of
the planned 600400-pixel CAPTCHA. If an image being placed overlaps with a previously
placed image, the images' pixels are blended together using weighted average blending. The
weighting varies depending on whether the overlapping image is a face; face images are
assigned higher weights for the blending process than non-face images to facilitate human
face recognition. These weights are stored in the parameter BE.
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Background generation and blending
CAPTCHA generation continues with the creation of a 600  400-pixel background image.
A series of circles, rectangles, crosses, and ellipses in varying sizes and colors are controlled
by parameter S . Skin-color patches are also included in the background to confuse skin
color-based segmentation algorithms. Finally, a series of erosion and dilation operations are
performed on the background to eliminate sharp edges present from the placed objects.
Once the erosion and dilation operations are completed, the generated background is
blended with the foreground containing the already placed images using a weighted average
blending scheme. Weights assigned to the background and the foreground are stored in
parameters BB and BF , respectively. The weight assigned to the foreground is higher in
regions where an overlap between the placed images already existed. This ensures that
every region in the FR-CAPTCHA image is discernible by humans.
Global distortion application
Figure 6.4: Samples of distortions applied during the FR-CAPTCHA generation process
[169]. Fake edges are free-form lines drawn throughout the CAPTCHA as in the left image.
Illumination variations make portions of the image lighter or darker, such as how the upper
half of the face in the middle image is lighter than the bottom half. Emoticon fakes are
emoticon-style images inserted into the CAPTCHA, such as the emoticon shown between
the two human faces in the right image.
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To complicate the process of image segmentation for a would-be attacker, a series of
distortions are applied to the blended CAPTCHA image. First, irregular variations in illu-
mination are added by dividing the CAPTCHA into a variable number of non-uniform grids.
These grids are then subjected to gamma adjustment with diering gamma values so that
some grids are made lighter and others darker.
Next, a random number of irregularly oriented jagged lines are drawn in a free-form style
throughout the image to create false edges. Then, emoticon images are blended into the
background at randomly selected locations to further confuse a would-be attacker. Finally,
a percentage of the total pixels, controlled by parameter DC , are randomly chosen to have
their values corrupted. This introduces noise into the image that can impair the operation
of face detection and face recognition algorithms. Fig. 6.4 illustrates the eect of several of
these distortions.
CAPTCHA parameter training
Training CAPTCHAs generated using the parameter settings in Table 6.1 are used to learn
the useful sets of parameters for generating the nal FR-CAPTCHA images. A set of param-
eters is considered to be useful if, when applied to generated images, humans can successfully
solve the resulting CAPTCHAs but the automatic face detection and face recognition ad-
versary algorithms cannot. The useful sets of parameters u are learned using:
u = Train(C=F (i;Iface;Inonface)(H = 1; Ad = 0) (6.3)
where H denotes the human response to solve the CAPTCHA and Ad denotes the response
from an automated attack adversary. A correct response is depicted with the value 1; an
incorrect response is depicted by 0. Out of the possible parameter sets i, only the useful
parameter sets u are chosen according to the specied constraint on H and Ad. The
constraint denotes the ideal criteria that a CAPTCHA has to fulll: maximum human
performance and minimum automated attacker performance. Parameter sets conforming to
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other constraints are not useful for FR-CAPTCHA generation. Furthermore, in Eq. 6.3,
the process Train represents gradient descent learning. For a given set of parameters t,
let EH;ad(t) be the objective function that minimizes the error caused by four conditions
associated with H and Ad:
EH;Ad(t) =
8>><>>:
0 if H = 1 and Ad = 0
1 otherwise.
(6.4)
Like with FaceDCAPTCHA, FR-CAPTCHA's gradient descent optimization process obtains
optimal generation parameters using these two equations:
5EH;Ad(t) = @EH;Ad(t)
@
(6.5)
t+1 = t   5 EH;Ad(t) (6.6)
Here, 5EH;Ad(t) represents the gradient of the error function at the tth learning iteration.
The variable  is the learning rate that controls the convergence of parameter learning. This
learning procedure involves determining the human response (H) as well as the adversarial
response for the automated face detection and face recognition algorithms (Ad); therefore, it
converges to the case where humans can solve the CAPTCHA but the adversarial algorithms
cannot.
Human responses were collected from participants attempting to complete the generated
training CAPTCHAs. The Viola-Jones face detector [153] and a commercial o-the-shelf
(COTS) face recognition system were used to provide adversarial responses using the follow-
ing methodology:
1. Given a CAPTCHA image C, a set of images c1 to cn is created by rotating the
CAPTCHA image by n incremental rotation levels ranging from 0 to 360 to model
the random rotation of the embedded images.
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2. For each CAPTCHA image c1 to cn, the Viola-Jones face detector [153] is used to
perform face detection.
3. The detected face coordinates are matched with the actual embedded genuine face
photograph locations. If an embedded face was correctly identied in any c1 : : : cn
image, it is considered to be found for C.
4. If all embedded faces in C were found, the face detector's adversarial response is
considered correct. Otherwise, it is incorrect.
5. Steps 2 through 4 are repeated using a COTS face recognition package in place of the
Viola-Jones face detector. If the face recognition package was able to correctly detect
two embedded faces, its face recognition module is invoked to attempt a match. The
face recognition adversary is considered to be successful if it is able to nd a correct
pair of embedded faces belonging to the same individual.
Final CAPTCHA generation using optimized parameters
Once training is complete, the nal optimized FR-CAPTCHA images are created using
the parameters learned by the gradient descent optimization process. These optimized
CAPTCHAs are generated by the same process described earlier in this section for the
training CAPTCHA images. Examples of the nal optimized FR-CAPTCHA images for
each parameter set are shown in Fig. 6.5.
6.2 Experimental results and analysis
Over 3,000 participants assisted in evaluating FR-CAPTCHA. This section describes the
images used in generating the CAPTCHA, the experimental protocol, and key results.
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Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
Set 4 Set 5 Set 6
Set 7 Set 8 Set 9
Set 10
Figure 6.5: Examples of FR-CAPTCHA images [169]. These images are numbered using the
set numbers in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.
6.2.1 Image databases
The images embedded in FR-CAPTCHA were taken from publicly available online images.
Human face photographs were taken from the AR Face Database [173]. Fake cartoons,
emoticons, and non-face distractor images were selected from Photobucket [162]. The fake
images were selected because they generated false positives when they were analyzed by face
detection algorithms. Of the source images, 40% were used in generating training images;
the remaining images were used to generate the nal optimized test CAPTCHAs.
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6.2.2 Participants and testing protocol
Human accuracy in solving FR-CAPTCHA images was tested by over 3,000 people. To
evaluate the 300 training images, a group of users was asked to repetitively complete as
many FR-CAPTCHA images as they wished using a device of their own choosing. This
facilitated gathering a large amount of data for training purposes in a short amount of
time. Evaluation of the 500 nal optimized images was completed using a much larger set
of unsupervised volunteers who were asked to access a FR-CAPTCHA protected website.
These users were asked to continue solving CAPTCHAs until they were successful.
Automated attack testing was performed using the Viola-Jones face detection algorithm
and a COTS face recognition system. If the attackers were able to detect the embedded
images needed to solve the CAPTCHA without any erroneous detections, their attack was
considered successful.
6.2.3 Analysis
Training results
A total of 220 volunteers recorded 1,794 attempts while evaluating training FR-CAPTCHA
images. Their overall success rate was 96%. The data shown in Table 6.2 provides valu-
able insight into the impact of applied distortions on human accuracy. In general, human
performance is degraded as more intense distortions are applied to the generated images.
Upon review of the results, the lowered human success rates for Sets 7 (79.2%) and 8 (90%)
stand out. These are the only sets that use more than a low level of background blending.
Like with other approaches, humans have diculty solving this CAPTCHA's tests under
conditions when the embedded images are heavily blended into the background.
In reviewing the remaining sets, rotation, global distortions, and emoticons appear to
have a relatively smaller impact on human success rates. They are better distortions to
emphasize when generating the nal optimized FR-CAPTCHAs than background blending.
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Table 6.2: Human performance on FR-CAPTCHA training images [169]
Set Distortions Used
Human
Success
1 No rotation, no blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 100%
2 Low rotation, no blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 100%
3 Low rotation, low blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 100%
4 Low rotation, low blend, low global distortions, no emoticons 100%
5 Low rotation, low blend, low global distortions, emoticons 100%
6 High rotation, low blend, low global distortions, no emoticons 100%
7 Low rotation, high blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 79.2%
8 Medium rotation, medium blend, no global distortions, emoticons 90.0%
9 Low rotation, low blend, low global distortions, no emoticons 100%
10 Low rotation, low blend, high global distortions, emoticons 92.0%
These distortions are overall much simpler and less intense than those used in previous
CAPTCHAs such as fgCAPTCHA. The added diculty that automated attackers face in
completing the face recognition task enables use of lighter distortions without sacricing
security.
The automated attack adversaries were able to locate a small percentage of faces in the
training sets with lower levels of distortions. They were unsuccessful in locating any genuine
faces in more heavily distorted sets.
Human performance evaluation
The nal optimized FR-CAPTCHA images were evaluated in 42,000 attempts recorded by
over 3,000 participants. Overall, these participants achieved an extremely high 94% success
rate in their attempts. While this rate is somewhat less than the 96% found during the
training, this rate represents a more diverse user base and is representative of real world
results. This 94% rate bests most other existing CAPTCHA solutions such as IMAGINA-
TION, Kluever's Video CAPTCHA, and Adamas [174, 104, 65].
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Table 6.3: Human and automated attack success rates for nal optimized FR-CAPTCHAs
Set Distortions Used
Human
Success
Attack
Success
1 No rotation, no blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 96.7% 0.0%
2 Low rotation, no blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 96.1% 0.0%
3 Low rotation, high blend, no global distortions, no emoticons 95.4% 0.0%
4 Medium rotation, low blend, no global distortions, no emoti-
cons
96.1% 0.0%
5 Medium rotation, no blend, low global distortions, no emoti-
cons
95.8% 0.0%
6 Medium rotation, low blend, low global distortions, no
emoticons
94.7% 0.0%
7 High rotation, medium blend, medium global distortions, no
emoticons
91.5% 0.0%
8 High rotation, low blend, medium global distortions, emoti-
cons
93.5% 0.0%
9 High rotation, high blend, high global distortions, emoticons 90.0% 0.0%
10 High rotation, low blend, high global distortions, emoticons 91.5% 0.0%
Overall 94.0% 0.0%
As during the training phase, human success rates varied depending on the intensity of
the distorted images. Table 6.3 provides a breakdown of success rates by distortion set. Set
1, which applied no distortions, had the highest human success rate at 96.7%. Set 9, which
had high levels of all distortions, had the lowest success rate at 90% with other sets falling
in between relative to the level of distortions applied.
Automated attack evaluation
Besides oering good human success rates, an eective CAPTCHA must also be resilient
against automated attacks. Since the rst step for an automated attacker in solving FR-
CAPTCHA would be to detect and segment the embedded faces, face detection tests were
conducted on the nal optimized FR-CAPTCHA images using the Viola-Jones face detection
algorithm and the COTS face recognition system used during training. These would-be
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attackers were unable to correctly detect any embedded face images, which indicates they
would be unable to solve FR-CAPTCHA. An existing attack strategy [93] used successfully
against the IMAGINATION CAPTCHA was also tested, but it was similarly unable to locate
the face pairs needed to solve FR-CAPTCHA.
Random guess-based brute force attacks are unlikely to succeed. Each FR-CAPTCHA
contains four embedded face pair images (two images for each of two pairs), with the face
region of each being approximately 100 100 pixels in size. Once the rst image is selected,
only one 100 100-pixel area out of the entire 600 400-pixel CAPTCHA that remains will
result in a successful solution. Thus, we can represent the likelihood of any one attempt
successfully solving an FR-CAPTCHA test as approximately 7 in 1000:

4 100 100
600 400

100 100
600 400  1

= 0:6944% (6.7)
6.3 Summary
By combining gradient descent-optimized images with a face recognition-based task, FR-
CAPTCHA succeeds in creating a security test that is easy for human users to solve while
remaining resilient against automated attack now. Because of the complexity of face recog-
nition, especially when images are distorted as in FR-CAPTCHA, it is expected that FR-
CAPTCHA's tests will retain their eectiveness against would-be attackers well into the
future.
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Chapter 7
MB-CAPTCHA
7.1 Proposed approach
7.1.1 CAPTCHA design
Despite extensive research, the detection of face, ngerprint, and eye features embedded
in larger images remains a challenging task for computers to perform. Humans, however,
are adept at locating these items. MB-CAPTCHA [175] takes advantage of this relative
dierence in abilities by incorporating multimodal biometrics into its tests. The CAPTCHA
presents users with complex images including embedded instructions along pictures of faces,
ngerprints, and eyes as shown in Fig. 7.1. To solve MB-CAPTCHA, users must interpret
the instructions (e.g., \Select all ngerprints and old faces") and select the embedded images
that meet the provided criteria. If the user is able to correctly select the matching images
without any mis-selections, they pass the CAPTCHA's test.
7.1.2 Generation process
The MB-CAPTCHA generation process can be represented as:
C = F (Iface; Ieye; Ifingerprint; ; d) (7.1)
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Figure 7.1: Sample MB-CAPTCHA image with correct answers circled in red.
where function F represents the series of image processing operations required to generate
CAPTCHA C. C contains embedded images selected from a combination of sets Iface, Ieye,
and Ifingerprint depending upon a selection task chosen from . d represents a diculty
level from 1 to 5 used to determine distortions and image characteristics for the rendered
CAPTCHA. CAPTCHAs with higher diculty levels are intended to be more challenging
to complete.
As shown in Fig. 7.2 and detailed below, several steps are involved in generating MB-
CAPTCHA images.
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Figure 7.2: Steps involved in generating MB-CAPTCHA images [175]. A selection task is
chosen to determine which items the user will be instructed to locate. Images matching
the selection task and non-matching distractor images are then selected and placed on a
generated background. Instructions are included in the image and then distortions are
applied to the CAPTCHA. Simulated attacks are conducted. If a simulated attacker can
solve the CAPTCHA, the generated image is discarded and a new one generated in its place.
Otherwise, the generated MB-CAPTCHA image is ready for use.
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Background generation
The generation of new MB-CAPTCHA tests begins with the creation of an 800  400-pixel
image containing a randomly shaded grayscale background. Between 900 and 1,500 geomet-
ric shapes, either circles, rectangles, or crosses, are semi-transparently overlaid in random
locations. Each individual shape is of a randomly selected size and grayscale shade. This
complex pattern is intended to create false targets to confuse object detection algorithms
that may be used to attack the CAPTCHA. During the testing conducted as part of this
research, automated algorithms detected many false faces, ngerprints, and eyes in the back-
ground that did not actually exist. Since mis-selections are treated as incorrect attempts,
these false images reduce the likelihood that an attack on the CAPTCHA is successful.
After all of the geometric shapes are placed, dilation is repeatedly performed on the entire
background. This operation sets each pixel to the maximum (lightest) value of its adjoining
pixels. It has the eect of creating a ragged, irregular border instead of crisp lines and
reduces the success rate of edge detection and segmentation-based attacks. Fig. 7.3 shows
an example of a rendered background after dilation is performed.
The dilation operation can be represented as [176]:
I  S =
[
p2I
Sp (7.2)
where I is the image being dilated, S is a 3  3 structuring element, and Sp is the value of
the structuring element centered at the pixel location p.
Selection task assignment
To solve a MB-CAPTCHA, users are required to select the embedded images that meet the
requirements of a specied selection task. This step determines the selection task that will
be used for a particular CAPTCHA image.
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Figure 7.3: Example of a rendered background after dilation [175].
The process begins by randomly choosing to use either one or two selection tasks for the
CAPTCHA. Next, the generation algorithm randomly picks specic tasks from these three
options:
1. Eye selection, where users must locate all of the images of eyes embedded in the
CAPTCHA.
2. Fingerprint selection, where users must locate all of the images of ngerprints embed-
ded in the CAPTCHA.
3. Face selection, where users are asked to select all embedded face photographs matching
a specied gender (male or female) or race (black or white) attribute. The attributes
are selected at random.
If two selection tasks are to be used for the CAPTCHA, the generation algorithm ensures
two dierent tasks are selected.
Image selection
After the selection tasks are chosen, the generation algorithm constructs two sets Imatch
and Inotmatch based on images that match and do not match, respectively, the CAPTCHA's
selection task requirements. Fig. 7.4 shows examples of the source eye, ngerprint, and face
images that are organized into sets Imatch and Inotmatch.
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Faces Fingerprints Eyes
Figure 7.4: Examples of source images that will be embedded in generated MB-CAPTCHAs
[175].
A total of four to eight matching and non-matching images are selected from sets Imatch
and Inotmatch for use in the CAPTCHA so that:
ntotal =
n
nmatch + nnotmatch
 nmatch  2; nnotmatch  2; 4  ntotal  8o (7.3)
nmatch, nnotmatch, and ntotal represent the number of matching, non-matching, and total
embedded images, respectively. At least two matching images are required to ensure that a
single guess cannot solve the CAPTCHA. Multiple non-matching images serve as false targets
to reduce the likelihood that an automated algorithm will correctly solve the CAPTCHA.
When face images are used, the images contain a background surrounding the face when
the diculty level is d  3. There is no background surrounding the face when d > 3.
Image placement
Each of the images to be embedded in the CAPTCHA is scaled to between 80  80 and
120  120 pixels in size to ensure there is room to embed the required number of images
within the CAPTCHA. The images are also rotated at randomly selected amounts between
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Figure 7.5: Samples of MB-CAPTCHA images [175]. Users must select the images specied
in the instructions to correctly solve the CAPTCHA.
[ 60; 60) degrees. The rotation decreases the likelihood that detection algorithms will cor-
rectly identify the images once embedded in the background.
The image placement algorithm randomly selects locations for the embedded images. In
choosing locations for placement, the algorithm ensures that the embedded images do not
overlap with each other or the edge of the CAPTCHA. It also maintains a 35-pixel margin
at the top of the CAPTCHA for the selection task instructions to be placed.
Each image is embedded using alpha compositing (partial transparency) so it blends into
the background. This blending interferes with object detection since the embedded images
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may have dierent contrasts, colorings, and edges than what the algorithms are trained to
detect.
Instructions rendering
Once all of the images have been placed, instructions for solving the CAPTCHA are ren-
dered. The instructions are displayed using the Arial font on a randomly shaded grayscale
background with a randomly selected alpha channel (transparency) value. The color of the
text varies upon the shade of the background: white text is used for darker backgrounds and
black text for lighter backgrounds. For cases where the diculty level is d = f1; 3; 5g, the
text is additionally blurred to decrease the likelihood of optical character recognition (OCR)
being able to identify the selection task needed to complete the CAPTCHA.
The rendered text image is stretched to t an area of 800  35 pixels, as shown in
the examples in Fig. 7.6. It is then embedded at the top of the CAPTCHA using alpha
compositing. In cases where the alpha value is low, the grayscale shading appears transparent
and the underlying complex background pattern shows through the text. This greatly reduces
the success rate of OCR attacks in correctly identifying the selection task required for the
CAPTCHA.
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Figure 7.6: Examples of instructions for solving MB-CAPTCHA prior to being rendered in
the CAPTCHA image [175].
Image distortion
Depending upon the diculty level d used in generating the CAPTCHA, additional visual
eects may be applied to the rendered CAPTCHA to distort the image. When d = f3; 5g,
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lines in various shades of gray may be drawn in random locations throughout the CAPTCHA
in a striped or crosshatch pattern. Many small randomly shaded grayscale squares are also
placed on the image when d = f3; 5g. These additional distortions are intended to interfere
with the ability of detection algorithms to locate and segment the images embedded in the
CAPTCHA or to perform OCR on the instructions. While the distortions have some negative
impact on human users, it is minimal compared to the eect on automated attackers.
Attack simulation
After each CAPTCHA image is rendered, it undergoes a series of tests designed to ensure
that it is not susceptible to attack by automated algorithms. The rst test involves using
best-of-breed commercial OCR in an attempt to detect the selection task specied by the
CAPTCHA's instructions. If the selection task can be correctly identied, further testing is
required to ensure the CAPTCHA's embedded images cannot be automatically detected:
1. If the selection task requires that faces be identied, the Face++ web service [177] is
used to locate embedded faces. This tool determines the likely race and gender for
each face it locates. The detected values are compared against the actual embedded
faces to see if the required faces were correctly found.
2. If the selection task requires that eyes be identied, a version of the Viola-Jones algo-
rithm [153] trained for eye detection is used to locate them. The detected locations
are compared against the actual eye locations.
3. If the selection task requires that ngerprints be identied, the SourceAFIS ngerprint
recognition software [178] is used to construct ngerprint templates based on the image.
The location of the templates' features are compared against the actual locations of
the embedded ngerprints to see if they match.
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Face++, Viola-Jones, and SourceAFIS are used as they can be performed in near real
time. Fast performance at this stage is critical since these tests are run in-the-loop during
the CAPTCHA generation process, and as such, occur frequently.
In the event these tests are able to correctly determine the selection task and identify
the images required to solve the CAPTCHA, the CAPTCHA image is discarded and the
generation process begins anew. This ensures that publicly used CAPTCHA test images
are resistant to automated attacks and viable as a security tool. Fig. 7.5 shows examples of
CAPTCHAs that have passed the simulated attacks and are ready for use.
7.2 Experimental results and analysis
MB-CAPTCHA has been evaluated by over 1,900 human users. This section provides the
details of the source image databases, participants, and protocol used in evaluating the
CAPTCHA along with results and analysis.
7.2.1 Image databases
MB-CAPTCHA uses three source databases to provide the face, ngerprint, and eye images
used in generating the CAPTCHAs: the University of North Carolina Wilmington Cranio-
facial Morphology Database is used for face images [179], eye images are from the IIITD
Multi-spectral Periocular Database [180], and ngerprint images are from the FVC2004
database [181].
7.2.2 Participants and testing protocol
MB-CAPTCHA was evaluated by 1,905 participants using a set of 473 rendered CAPTCHA
images. Participants attempted to access a website protected by MB-CAPTCHA in an
uncontrolled environment on a device of their choosing. Users were asked to continue at-
tempting to solve the CAPTCHA until their attempts were successful.
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7.2.3 Analysis
Human performance evaluation
Participants recorded a total of 30,664 attempts at solving MB-CAPTCHA. The overall
human success rate across all selection tasks was 83.6%, but Table 7.1 shows there was
signicant variation in success rates depending upon the exact selection task used. Humans
were best able to solve CAPTCHAs where they were just asked to locate embedded items,
such as eyes and ngerprints, rather than tasks where they had to both locate and categorize
items, such as when selecting faces of specied genders or races. Users could generally identify
the location of faces but sometimes failed to properly categorize them. Part of this diculty
may arise from ambiguity in the embedded images. For example, more than half of the users
failed to identify the circled face in Fig. 7.7 as being a man.
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Figure 7.7: Many people did not accurately identify the gender of the circled face [175].
The CAPTCHAs' diculty level and associated distortions seem to have minimal impact
on humans' ability to successfully solve them. One situation where distortions do appear
to hinder humans is when crosshatched lines or rectangles are placed on top of embedded
images, as sometimes happens in CAPTCHAs with a diculty level of d = f3; 5g. These
distortions can make it dicult to detect the embedded object, or in the case of faces, to
correctly identify their attributes. Fig. 7.8 shows an example where a rectangle placed over
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Table 7.1: MB-CAPTCHA success rates by selection task [175]
c 
2
0
1
6
IE
E
E
Selection Task Human Success Attack Success
Eyes 90.5% 0.0%
Fingerprints 89.4% 0.0%
Faces of specied race, eyes 87.9% 0.0%
Fingerprints, eyes 83.7% 0.0%
Faces of specied race 80.0% 0.0%
Faces of specied gender and race 72.7% 0.0%
Faces of specied gender 72.1% 0.0%
Faces of specied gender, ngerprints 67.1% 0.0%
Faces of specied gender, eyes 63.8% 0.0%
Faces of specied race, ngerprints 62.8% 0.0%
Overall 83.6% 0.0%
an embedded image caused many users to fail to select the circled face. Otherwise, the
impact of the diculty levels and distortions was slight.
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Figure 7.8: Many users failed to select the circled face [175]. The overlaid rectangle makes
it dicult to determine the person's gender.
Automated attack evaluation
Since MB-CAPTCHA's generation process is designed to remove images susceptible to ob-
ject detection-based automated attacks, one of the most likely remaining avenues of attack
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involves brute force random guessing. Each CAPTCHA contains two to six images that
must be selected, each on average about 100  100 pixels in size, from an area 800  400
pixels in size. The chance of a single random guess at correctly answering the CAPTCHA
is microscopic:

1
5
 6X
i=2
 
iY
j=1
(100 100)j
(800 400)  (i  j)
!
= 0:0433% (7.4)
As previously shown CAPTCHA test images are not repeated until the set of all unseen
images have been exhausted, it is unlikely that a would-be attacker would see the same
CAPTCHA test again for some time after a failed attempt. When combined with the less
than 1-in-2,000 chance of correctly solving an individual attempt, it becomes extremely
time-consuming to use a brute force approach to defeat MB-CAPTCHA.
7.3 Summary
MB-CAPTCHA represents a dierent approach to image-based CAPTCHAs than the pre-
vious face-based designs. By incorporating three biometric modalities (eye, ngerprint, and
attribute-specic face recognition), MB-CAPTCHA provides a solution that is signicantly
more challenging for automated attackers to solve while providing relatively high human
success rates that are comparable to those oered by existing solutions like the 2017 version
of DeepCAPTCHA [139] and the MSN CAPTCHA [22].
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Chapter 8
aiCAPTCHA
8.1 Proposed approach
8.1.1 CAPTCHA design
Compared to the previously covered approaches, aiCAPTCHA [182] uses a wider set of em-
bedded objects to provide greater resiliency against improved face detection and recognition
attack strategies [183, 184]. As illustrated in Fig. 8.1, aiCAPTCHA presents users with a
composite image containing a stack of photographs of items representing 100 classes and 172
attributes (e.g., green tractors). Users are instructed to select specic items present in the
CAPTCHA image, such as black chairs or red tomatoes. If the user is able to select all of
the required objects, allowing one mistake where they fail to select a genuine object or select
an incorrect object, their attempt is counted as correct.
While object recognition tasks similar to those used in aiCAPTCHA have been exten-
sively studied in computer vision [185, 186, 187], existing solutions remain inferior to the
human visual system and are generally optimized for a handful of object types; they perform
poorly when used with extensive object classes like those used by aiCAPTCHA. To further
ensure that automated attackers are unable to solve aiCAPTCHA tests, the generation
process incorporates a negative selection-based articial immune system that identies and
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Figure 8.1: Example of an aiCAPTCHA test based on identifying white owers. The correct
answers are circled in red.
removes CAPTCHAs found to be susceptible to automated attack. This process ensures
a good balance between ease-of-use for legitimate users and resiliency against automated
attackers.
8.1.2 Generation process
The aiCAPTCHA generation process can be represented as:
C = F (width; height; O; I;H; d; A) (8.1)
where function F represents the series of operations required to generate a new aiCAPTCHA
of dimensions width-by-height pixels. The required object type used for the CAPTCHA test
is randomly chosen from O, the set of all tagged object classes and attributes. True target
and false target photographs are taken from object-tagged set I. H contains precomputed
Histogram of Oriented Gradient (HOG) descriptors for each photograph in I, an alternate
representation of image data that can be used to identify similar images [188]. d repre-
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Figure 8.2: An overview of the aiCAPTCHA generation process [182]. The process begins
with an attribute-tagged set of images and accompanying set of HOG descriptors. The true
target photographs users will be required to select are chosen, and then false and background
distractor images are selected based on the relationship of their HOG descriptors to the
selected true target photographs. The images are placed on a generated table top image
and distortions are applied. A negative selection-based articial immune system conducts
simulated attacks on the generated CAPTCHAs to remove images that are vulnerable to
attack from the set of public aiCAPTCHAs.
sents a diculty level in the range [1; 4] that determines the distortions added to generated
CAPTCHAs and A represents the attack algorithms to be used in conducting negative se-
lection and deletion of vulnerable CAPTCHAs. The resulting attack-resistant generated
aiCAPTCHA is C.
As shown in Fig. 8.2, a number of steps are involved in the generation of aiCAPTCHA
images. They are described below.
Background generation
Generation of a new aiCAPTCHA image begins with the creation of a background of size
width height pixels, where large sizes (at least 750 750) are preferred to improve image
quality on high resolution displays and to minimize the likelihood of a successful attack. The
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background is designed to resemble a table top upon which a stack of photographs will be
placed.
Target object type selection
Once the background is generated, one object class-attribute combination (object type),
designated oselected, is randomly chosen from O to use for the CAPTCHA test. This target
object type will determine which photographs are embedded in the aiCAPTCHA image and
will be provided to users in the instructions to solve the CAPTCHA.
True target photograph selection
Using the chosen target object type oselected, between three and ve images are randomly
chosen from the subset of corresponding photographs Idselected . These images, represented by
Ptrue, will be embedded in the resulting aiCAPTCHA image and serve as true targets to be
selected when solving the CAPTCHA.
False target photograph selection
Next, false target photographs are chosen to function as distractors for a would-be attacker.
False targets are chosen by rst calculating the Euclidean distance between the HOG descrip-
tor for each photograph in Ptrue relative to each photograph in Inotselected = fI   Ioselectedg.
The photographs with a smaller Euclidean distance in their HOG descriptors are more visu-
ally similar and are ideal for use in the CAPTCHA. A would-be attacker may be more likely
to confuse one visually similar photograph for another and thus fail at solving aiCAPTCHA.
For each true target photograph in Ptrue, the three to four photographs in Inotselected with
the smallest Euclidean distance between their HOG descriptors are added to Pfalse to serve
as false targets in the aiCAPTCHA image.
An additional 10 to 20 randomly selected photographs from Inotselected are added to
Pbackground to provide a confusing background upon which Ptrue and Pfalse will be layered.
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Photograph preparation and placement
After selecting Pbackground, Ptrue, and Pfalse, each photograph in these sets is rotated and
scaled as follows [158]:
266664
x0
y0
1
377775 =
266664
sxcos  sysin 0
sxsin sycos 0
0 0 1
377775
266664
x
y
1
377775 (8.2)
Here, sx and sy are the scaling factors in the x and y directions respectively and  is the
clockwise rotation angle. The scaling parameters are determined based on the individual
size of each photograph, and  is varied randomly within a range carefully chosen to avoid
extremely low or extremely high rotations. (x0; y0) denote the new coordinates for each
pixel (x; y) of each photograph. The scaling allows for consistent sizing of each photograph
(approximately 100 100 pixels) so it can be easily viewed. The rotation helps achieve the
desired output in the form of a stack of photographs.
After scaling and rotation, the photographs may be subjected to the tear distortion when
diculty level d = f3; 4g. The tear distortion is applied to each photograph individually by
randomly selecting one or more pairs of points on the image. For each of these pairs, one
point is designated as the starting point (x0; y0) and the other is designated as the ending
point (xf ; yf ). A number of lines, each denoted by T (initialized with the starting point
(x0; y0)), are constructed between each starting and ending point as follows:
T = T
[
(
xf   xt
xf
rx(); yf   yt
yf
ry()) (8.3)
Here, (xt; yt) denotes the latest point added to the line T , (xf ; yf ) denotes the ending point
for this line. rx() and ry() both denote random functions that are either 0 or 1 but with
the constraint that for each step rx() + ry()  1. Therefore, at each step, Eq. 8.3 takes a
one pixel step towards the ending point but it may choose from three possible directions.
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Each line T starting from the same pair of starting and ending points is added to the set of
tear lines T and the pixels of the image for each point in this set ((x; y) 2 T) are modied
as follows:
I 0(x; y) =
n
t+ j 2 [ v;+v]
o
(8.4)
where I 0(x; y) denotes the new value for the pixel at location (x; y) for the particular image
I. t denotes the base tear color (either gray or white). The variable  represents a small
change in the range of [+v; v] where v denotes the maximum permissible deviation from
the base tear color.
Next, a random walk function is used to create a ragged edge eect around each photo-
graph. Finally, the colors in the photographs are manipulated to make object recognition
more challenging.
After all the visual eects are added, each photograph in Pbackground is placed layer by
layer at random locations on the background. Next, the photographs in Ptrue and Pfalse are
placed in the top-most layer so that the true target Ptrue photographs are always completely
visible to the user.
Global distortion
Once the entire aiCAPTCHA image is generated, a dust eect is applied globally for diculty
levels d = f2; 4g. The goal of the dust eect is to make aiCAPTCHA harder to solve for
automated attackers while adding a type of noise that is commonly seen by human eyes, i.e.,
the settling of dust. In order to emulate this eect, we divide the aiCAPTCHA image into
regions and apply a blending eect to the pixels belonging to a region as follows:
I 0(x; y) = wiI(x; y) + wdD (8.5)
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Here, I 0(x; y) and I(x; y) denote the modied and original values of the pixel at location
(x; y) of the aiCAPTCHA image, respectively. D is the dust color that is set at (242, 168, 0)
RGB. wi and wd are the weights for the original pixel and the dust color D used in the
weighted sum-based blending approach so that wi +wd = 1 and wd varies between 0:1 to 0:3
depending on the image region.
Negative selection and deletion of vulnerable CAPTCHAs
To ensure the viability of aiCAPTCHA as a security tool, it is important that all of the
images presented to users are resilient to automated attacks. Much as biological immune
systems use a negative selection process to identify and eliminate immune cells that do not
properly guard against foreign attackers, aiCAPTCHA employs an articial immune system
with its own negative selection process to identify and remove aiCAPTCHA images that may
not successfully protect the guarded resource from automated attack [189]. Rather than use
generated detectors as in a traditional negative selection algorithm [190], aiCAPTCHA's
process uses input from three distinct object recognition algorithms as simulated attackers
to determine which aiCAPTCHA images should be removed:
1. SIFT (Scale-Invariant Feature Transform) keypoint-based matching [191, 192], which
generates feature-based descriptions of images. The features generated from the aiCAPTCHA
images are compared to already tagged image templates representing known objects
using a 0.6 cosine similarity threshold. If the threshold is met, the object identied in
the aiCAPTCHA is labeled.
2. Bag of Visual Words image classication [193], which constructs a sparse vector of his-
tograms representing image features and then uses a Naive Bayes classier to attempt
to match those to the feature histograms of previously trained images.
3. Discriminatively-trained deformable part-based model (DPM) categorization [194, 195],
which builds multiscale deformable models representing portions of images. Support
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vector machines are used to match the models generated from aiCAPTCHA images to
previously trained known models of objects.
Simulated attacks are conducted against generated aiCAPTCHA images using each of
the three algorithms. If any algorithm successfully identies the objects in at least half of
the true target photographs, the CAPTCHA is considered to be defective and is deleted
from the aiCAPTCHA database by the negative selection algorithm. This ensures that
the resulting aiCAPTCHA images are resilient to adversarial external attacks. As shown by
Table 8.1, approximately 14% of generated aiCAPTCHA images were deleted by the negative
selection algorithm while conducting this research. CAPTCHA with no distortions or just
dust-type distortions were most likely to be found by the automated attackers; addition of
the tear distortion reduced the likelihood of a successful automated attack by one-third.
Fig. 8.3 shows examples of aiCAPTCHA images that have passed the negative selection
attack process and are ready for use.
Table 8.1: Number of aiCAPTCHAs solved by attackers in negative selection articial im-
mune system while generating images [182]
c 
2
0
1
7
IE
E
E
Generated CAPTCHAs 860
CAPTCHAs solved by SIFT 33
CAPTCHAs solved by Bag of Visual Words 0
CAPTCHAs solved by DPM 91
Defective Attackable CAPTCHAs Deleted from Database 124
Remaining Resilient CAPTCHAs for Public Use 736
8.2 Experimental results and analysis
Generated aiCAPTCHA images were tested by over 3,000 human participants. This section
provides details of the source images, research participants, and protocol used in evaluating
aiCAPTCHA along with results and analysis.
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Figure 8.3: Four examples of aiCAPTCHA images that passed the negative selection-based
ltering process [182]. The true target photographs needed to solve the CAPTCHA are
outlined.
8.2.1 Image databases
To generate aiCAPTCHA images, a database with attribute-labeled images of various object
categories is required. Since existing object databases are either: (a) not labeled with
attributes, or (b) restricted to specic groups of objects such as animals, a new database was
collected to support this research. Collection began with the creation of a list of object classes
and associated attributes for each class. For example, cats may have the attributes \white,"
\gray," or \black" based on color, whereas books may be \open" or \closed" depending on
their position. Overall, 100 classes with 172 attribute-based subclasses were identied.
The identied classes and attributes were used to generate search queries to retrieve im-
ages for each combination of object class and attribute. The retrieved images were manually
ltered to remove images that did not accurately represent the intended object class and
attribute. The resulting database contains a total of 7,765 tagged images.
8.2.2 Participants and testing protocol
aiCAPTCHA was evaluated by 2,283 participants using a set of 736 rendered CAPTCHAs
from the aiCAPTCHA and aiCAPTCHA+UX databases. Participants attempted to access
portions of a website protected by aiCAPTCHA. Participants were unsupervised and allowed
to use their choice of browser and computing device (desktop computer, laptop, tablet, or
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smartphone). One aiCAPTCHA image was presented at a time. Users were asked to continue
attempting to solve the CAPTCHAs until their attempts were successful.
Initially, all CAPTCHAs which pass the negative selection ltering process are placed
in the aiCAPTCHA database. Over time, the CAPTCHAs that demonstrate a good user
experience by achieving a 90% human success rate over the rst 10 attempts are migrated to
the aiCAPTCHA+UX database; the CAPTCHAs not meeting this threshold are discarded.
This novel adaptive ltering mechanism ensures that CAPTCHAs in the aiCAPTCHA+UX
database are both resilient to external attacks and provide an excellent user experience as
quantitatively determined by user performance.
8.2.3 Analysis
Human performance evaluation
In total, 30,155 attempts to solve aiCAPTCHA were recorded with 7,360 attempts from
CAPTCHAs in the aiCAPTCHA database and 22,795 attempts from CAPTCHAs in the
aiCAPTCHA+UX database. As shown in Table 8.2, humans achieved a 94.6% success rate
(correct 19 of 20 times) when attempting CAPTCHAs in the aiCAPTCHA+UX database.
Table 8.2: Success rates for aiCAPTCHA databases [182]
c 
2
0
1
7
IE
E
E
Database
Number of User Human Attack
CAPTCHAs Attempts Success Success
aiCAPTCHA 736 7,360 80.7% 0.0%
aiCAPTCHA+UX 410 22,795 94.6% 0.0%
The tested aiCAPTCHAs came from four distinct diculty levels, each with its own set
of distortions applied during the generation process. Use of these levels, shown in Table 8.3,
can be determined by the application where the aiCAPTCHAs are deployed and the security
needed. Overall, the impact of the diculty levels and distortions on human success rates
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Table 8.3: Evaluating success rates on aiCAPTCHA database images by diculty level [182]
c 
2
0
1
7
IE
E
E Diculty Level Distortions Used Attempts Human Success
Level 1 No dust or tear distortions 1,770 82.8%
Level 2 Dust distortions only 1,770 79.3%
Level 3 Tear distortions only 1,920 81.3%
Level 4 Both tear and dust distortions 1,900 79.0%
was small. Humans performed about 4% better on aiCAPTCHA database images with no
distortions than those with both the tear and dust distortions.
Automated attack evaluation
The aiCAPTCHA generation process is designed to be resilient against attacks by conven-
tional image classiers through its articial immune system. Unconventional and brute force
attacks remain possible although testing with best-of-breed approaches nds them unlikely
to succeed. Fig. 8.4 illustrates the results of attempting one such unconventional attack, im-
age recognition with Very Deep Convolutional Networks [196], on two aiCAPTCHA images.
As the gure shows, the algorithm was unsuccessful in correctly identifying the objects of
interest in the CAPTCHAs.
Brute force attempts, where an attacker selects random locations in the CAPTCHA, are
similarly likely to fail. Each aiCAPTCHA contains three to ve true target photographs.
Since one target is allowed to be missed in a successful attempt for the sole purpose of an
improved user experience, an attacker would need to correctly identify between two and four
targets to solve the CAPTCHA. Each target is approximately 100 100 pixels in size, with
the overall aiCAPTCHA image size being at least 750750 pixels. Thus, the average chance
of a single brute force attempt at correctly solving aiCAPTCHA is extremely small:

1
3
 4X
i=2
 
iY
j=1
(100 100)j
(750 750)  (i  j)
!
= 0:0223% (8.6)
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Figure 8.4: Deep learning strategies were unsuccessful at correctly identifying the objects
embedded in aiCAPTCHA images needed to solve the CAPTCHAs [182]. The labels atop
each image above list the objects identied by Very Deep Convolutional Networks as being
present in the image. None were accurate.
Since previously shown aiCAPTCHA test images are not repeated until all other unseen
images have been exhausted, a would-be attacker would likely have to wait hundreds of times
before they will see the same aiCAPTCHA image again if their attempt is unsuccessful.
When combined with the 2-in-10,000 chance of correctly solving the CAPTCHA on a given
attempt, a would-be attacker would likely spend a signicant amount of time using a brute
force approach to successfully attack aiCAPTCHA.
8.3 Summary
aiCAPTCHA represents a novel combination of an attribute-based object recognition CAPTCHA
with a negative selection-based articial immune system and two-phase ltering model that
provides a security mechanism eective at preventing automated attacks without compro-
mising the user experience. aiCAPTCHA has a high 94.6% human success rate for attempts
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on CAPTCHAs in the aiCAPTCHA+UX database, well above the 70%-80% rate of existing
CAPTCHAs such as reCAPTCHA and IMAGINATION [22, 97], and is designed to facili-
tate use on both traditional computers and touchscreen devices. When combined with its
near zero likelihood of successful attacks, it oers signicant advantages over CAPTCHAs
commonly employed today.
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Chapter 9
CAPTCHA Evaluation Platform
9.1 Purpose
Evaluation of the CAPTCHAs proposed in this research has required extensive human test-
ing. The information collected from attempts at solving the 9,715 CAPTCHA images gen-
erated by this research (including click locations, answer timing, and browser environment
details) represents several hundred megabytes of data. Management of the testing process
and analysis of the resulting data has required the development of an extensive evaluation
platform.
The CAPTCHA Evaluation Platform was developed to fulll several key requirements:
1. Allow for customized selection of CAPTCHA tests for each user attempt.
Every time a CAPTCHA is requested, a new CAPTCHA of the appropriate type must
be selected for the particular user. To allow for rapid testing of a large number of
CAPTCHAs, and also to increase resiliency against automated attacks, it is important
that the same CAPTCHAs not be repeatedly displayed for a given user.
2. Facilitate display of selected CAPTCHAs. Once a CAPTCHA has been selected,
the user's computer must be able to load the images and resources required to complete
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it. The platform must guard against attempts to undermine the CAPTCHA's security
benets by preventing diversion of CAPTCHA tests to third parties [197].
3. Collect data on attempts and user computing environments. In order to eval-
uate each attempt at solving a CAPTCHA, the locations users select in the CAPTCHA
must be recorded. Additional information on the user's computing environment and re-
sponses are also logged to facilitate in-depth analysis and understanding of CAPTCHA
performance.
4. Validate attempts at solving CAPTCHAs. Each attempt must be validated to
determine if it was a correct solution. The platform must further ensure that the
attempt was recorded by the intended user and not by a third party.
5. Analysis of collected result sets. The platform must provide tools to view and
analyze the collected data on a variety of metrics to allow for understanding of how
the CAPTCHAs performed and how they can be improved.
9.2 Proposed approach
9.2.1 Platform design
The proposed platform has two major components: (a) a publicly accessible testing module
to facilitate use of CAPTCHAs and (b) an internal analysis module to analyze data collected
from CAPTCHA use.
The testing module is designed as a RESTful web service, a type of application program-
ming interface (API) where clients use stateless HTTP requests to interact with a server
[198]. By sending properly formatted HTTP GET and POST requests to dened URLs,
clients, such as browsers and servers hosting CAPTCHA-protected webpages, can request
new CAPTCHAs, load CAPTCHA images, and submit recorded data to determine if user
attempts were valid.
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The CAPTCHA web service is written in the C# programming language using the Mi-
crosoft ASP.NET Core 1.0 web application framework [199]. It is run on a Microsoft Windows
Server 2012 R2 server with Microsoft Internet Information Services 8.5; this same server also
stores the CAPTCHA images and supporting les. A large multi-table SQL database run-
ning on Microsoft SQL Server 2012 manages information on the available CAPTCHAs and
stores records on each attempt.
Two code libraries were developed to support interaction with the CAPTCHA web service
by browsers and web servers, respectively. The browser library is written in JavaScript and
runs natively within all modern browsers. It is responsible for requesting and displaying
CAPTCHA images. It also records each click or tap made in solving the CAPTCHA along
with details on the browser environment. This information is stored in a hidden form eld
for validation. The browser library makes use of three external JavaScript libraries (JQuery
[200], jCanvas [201], and Bowser [202]) to manipulate webpages and interact with the web
service, to display an indicator on the locations where users have already clicked, and to
record browser environment details, respectively.
The second code library is for use on servers hosting CAPTCHA-protected webpages.
These servers must be able to determine if a would-be user correctly solved their CAPTCHA
before granting access to protected resources. The C#-based server library submits the
CAPTCHA attempt data collected from each user's browser to the web service for validation,
and then processes the result returned by the web service.
The analysis module is designed as a series of extensions to the Microsoft SQL Server 2012
database used by the testing module. These extensions calculate a variety of statistics that
can be used to measure the performance of tested CAPTCHAs on dierent characteristics
such as their embedded images, distortion types, and diculty levels. Database views are
also provided to present raw CAPTCHA and attempt data in a de-normalized form to allow
further analysis with external tools such as Microsoft Access, Microsoft Excel, and R.
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9.2.2 Method of operation
Displaying CAPTCHAs
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Figure 9.1: Communications between a browser and other servers required to display a
CAPTCHA.
The process of displaying a CAPTCHA involves communication between a user's browser
and several dierent servers. Fig. 9.1 illustrates each step in the process.
<script src="jquery.min.js"></script >
<script src="jcanvas.min.js"></script >
<script src="bowser.min.js"></script >
<script src="CaptchaApi.es5.min.js"></script >
<form method="post">
<div id="captchaapi_captcha" data -captchaapi_siteguid="site -identifier"
data -captchaapi_displaygroupname="aicaptcha"></div>
<input type="submit" />
</form>
Figure 9.2: HTML code to embed a CAPTCHA
To use a CAPTCHA, a web developer must embed ve lines of HTML code into their
webpage, as shown in Fig. 9.2. Four lines are SCRIPT tags to load the JavaScript browser
library and its dependencies to allow the CAPTCHA to be retrieved and to record the
user attempt. The fth line, the CAPTCHA DIV tag, congures the CAPTCHA and in-
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dicates where it is to be displayed in the webpage. Two data parameters must be speci-
ed: (a) data-captchaapi siteguid, a unique identier to authorize the website to dis-
play CAPTCHAs and (b) data-captchaapi displaygroupname, which indicates the type
of CAPTCHA to be displayed. The CAPTCHA DIV tag must be included inside a form
to facilitate submission of attempt data. In most common use cases, such as when the
CAPTCHA is used to augment a login page, the CAPTCHA can be added to an existing
form.
When users visit a webpage, their browser communicates with the web server hosting the
page to download its contents. As the browser loads the document, it identies additional
items such as images and JavaScript code that must also be loaded. The browser then
retrieves these items; in the case of a webpage containing a CAPTCHA, this includes the
JavaScript browser library and its dependencies.
The browser library automatically runs once the webpage is fully loaded. It parses the
document to locate the CAPTCHA DIV tag. The data parameters, along with the value of
the tracking cookie, if already set, are sent to the CAPTCHA web service to request a new
CAPTCHA.
When the web service receives the request for a new CAPTCHA, it rst veries the
provided site identier corresponds with the congured website address and is authorized
to display the CAPTCHA. If the website is authorized, the web service queries its database
to select a new CAPTCHA of the type requested. If a tracking cookie was provided in
the CAPTCHA request, it is used to ensure that a previously selected CAPTCHA is not
chosen again; if no tracking cookie was provided, a new one is generated for future use. By
eliminating repetitive display of the same CAPTCHAs through use of the tracking cookie,
the platform is able to improve its resilience against automated attacks while also allowing
for faster evaluation of large CAPTCHA image sets. The selected CAPTCHA is logged
in the database along with the tracking cookie and the user's IP address. HTML code is
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generated to display the CAPTCHA images and instructions. This HTML code, along with
the tracking cookie, is then returned to the browser.
The browser embeds the HTML code it receives from the web service inside of the
CAPTCHA DIV tag. It displays the updated webpage and makes another request to the
web service to load the image for the CAPTCHA test. The web service veries the request
comes from the same IP address as the original CAPTCHA request and that the image has
not already been displayed; these checks help to ensure that the CAPTCHA is not diverted
to be solved by a third party. If the checks do not indicate any issues, the CAPTCHA image
is sent to the browser and the attempt's record is updated to reect the image has been
shown.
When the browser receives the CAPTCHA image, it displays it for the user. The
CAPTCHA is now ready to be solved.
Solving CAPTCHAs
(a) Unsolved CAPTCHA
(b) Solved CAPTCHA with blue dots on se-
lected locations
Figure 9.3: Examples of aiCAPTCHA.
A CAPTCHA can be solved once its instructions and image have been displayed. Fig. 9.3a
shows how a CAPTCHA appears in its initial unsolved state.
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Users complete the CAPTCHA test by clicking (with a mouse) or tapping (on a touch-
screen) on the locations in the CAPTCHA image specied in the instructions. Every time
the user selects a location within the CAPTCHA image, jCanvas updates the CAPTCHA
image to show a blue dot on the selected locations, as depicted in Fig. 9.3b. The browser
library also records the coordinates of the selected location, the current time, and other
details in a hidden form eld created by the web service-provided CAPTCHA HTML code.
When users have nished solving the CAPTCHA, they click a button to submit the form
containing the CAPTCHA. Their results are sent to the server hosting the CAPTCHA-
containing webpage to determine if the user should be granted access to the resource pro-
tected by the CAPTCHA.
Validating CAPTCHA results
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Figure 9.4: Communications between a browser and other servers required to validate a
CAPTCHA attempt.
When the web server hosting the CAPTCHA-containing webpage receives a form sub-
mission containing a recorded CAPTCHA attempt, it extracts the CAPTCHA information.
These recorded details, along with the user's IP address, are sent to the CAPTCHA web
service for validation.
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The web service rst queries its database to ensure the attempt has not been previously
submitted and that the submission was from the same IP address that originally requested
the CAPTCHA. If both items are valid, indicating the CAPTCHA has not been repeat-
edly attempted or diverted to a third party, the web service retrieves the solution for the
attempted CAPTCHA from the database. Using an algorithm appropriate for the specic
CAPTCHA, the user's attempt is veried to determine if it correctly solved the test. De-
tails on the user's submitted attempt are recorded in the database along with the result of
whether or not the CAPTCHA was correctly solved.
After details are logged, the CAPTCHA web service sends a message to the hosting
web server indicating whether the CAPTCHA was correctly solved. The hosting web server
processes this result and takes action accordingly. In general, if the user correctly solved the
CAPTCHA, they will be granted access to the resource being protected by the CAPTCHA.
If the user's attempt was incorrect, they may be prompted to try solving a new CAPTCHA.
Results analysis
Analysis of collected CAPTCHA data is performed by connecting to the CAPTCHA
database, either directly through SQL Server Management Studio [203] or via ODBC-
compliant software such as Microsoft Access. These programs allow access to the
pre-established database views providing aggregated statistics on recorded CAPTCHA
attempts and by several CAPTCHA generation parameters. Custom queries can be created
to explore areas of interest in more detail, and the export tools of these programs can
facilitate further data analysis with other software.
9.3 Experimental results
The web service at the core of the CAPTCHA Evaluation Platform is currently in
use at https://api.captcharesearch.com. This web service, along with the sup-
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porting JavaScript browser library and C# hosting server library, are used by two
websites to facilitate human performance data collection. On https://cs101.wvu.edu,
the CAPTCHA has been integrated into the system students use to record their lec-
ture attendance for the Computer Science 101 course at West Virginia University.
The https://www.captcharesearch.com website provides information on each of the
CAPTCHAs developed as part of this research, including access to working demonstrations
of each CAPTCHA type. Fig. 9.5 shows how these CAPTCHAs appear on their respective
websites.
(a) cs101.wvu.edu Attendance System (b) www.captcharesearch.com demo page
Figure 9.5: Examples of CAPTCHAs deployed using the CAPTCHA Evaluation Platform.
Through the instances embedded on the cs101.wvu.edu and www.captcharesearch.com
websites, the CAPTCHA Evaluation Platform has been used to record 183,230 attempts on
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the CAPTCHAs proposed in this research. These attempts were completed using variety of
computing devices including desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones. All mod-
ern browsers were successfully tested including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft
Internet Explorer, Microsoft Edge, Safari, and Opera. The collected results were subse-
quently analyzed using the Evaluation Platform's analysis module and appear throughout
this dissertation.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
10.1 Conclusions
While there are a number of existing CAPTCHA implementations in use to protect online
systems from automated attacks, these solutions exhibit signicant shortcomings. Few pro-
vide for quick, accurate completion by humans while remaining resilient against automated
attacks. As the world increasingly moves from accessing the Internet using desktop and lap-
top computers to using smartphones and tablets, many also suer from usability challenges.
The text-based input methods traditionally favored by CAPTCHAs such as MSN [66] and
reCAPTCHA [81] are dicult to use with the auto-correct-assisted touchscreens commonly
seen on mobile devices. There is a need for modern CAPTCHAs that balance human ease
of use across a wide variety of devices with strong security performance.
This research has proposed a series of CAPTCHAs designed to meet these challenges, as
well as a CAPTCHA Evaluation Platform designed to facilitate use of these CAPTCHAs.
We began by creating Face Detection CAPTCHA as an initial example of a new style of
composite image CAPTCHA based on face detection, a task that humans are good at per-
forming but automated algorithms nd challenging. Face Detection CAPTCHA served as a
test platform for dierent types of image distortions, simulated attacks on CAPTCHAs, and
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human evaluation processes. While it has a comparatively weak performance, with a 71.8%
human success rate and 9.3% automated attack success rate, Face Detection CAPTCHA's
development provided benecial insights into images, distortions, and other generation pa-
rameters to use for future CAPTCHAs.
FaceDCAPTCHA builds upon Face Detection CAPTCHA, replacing its xed distortion
levels with settings chosen by a gradient descent-based optimization process that incorpo-
rates results from human users and automated adversaries. This optimization signicantly
enhances the CAPTCHA's performance, with FaceDCAPTCHA showing a human success
rate of 86.6% and an automated attack success rate of 0% on its nal optimized CAPTCHAs.
fgCAPTCHA further improves this optimization process by using a genetic learning algo-
rithm and image quality metrics-based simulations to eliminate the need for human testing
in the optimization process. With the genetic learning algorithm's ability to customize each
individual CAPTCHA, fgCAPTCHA's human success rate improved to 87.9% while main-
taining the same 0% attack success rate.
We next proposed FR-CAPTCHA, which uses face recognition rather than face detection
as its test. In this CAPTCHA, users are required to identify a pair of embedded faces
belonging to the same individual rather than all of the human faces as in the previous
CAPTCHAs. Face recognition is a more dicult task for computers to complete than face
detection. The change to a more challenging task permits the use of simpler and less intense
distortions in FR-CAPTCHA, which has the eect of boosting human performance to a high
94% success rate without sacricing reliability against automated attackers.
We continued by creating MB-CAPTCHA, which incorporates several biometric modal-
ities in addition to faces. MB-CAPTCHA requires users to identify embedded ngerprints,
eyes, and/or faces categorized by gender or race as specied by instructions included in
the CAPTCHA image. This adds additional complexity for automated attackers since they
must locate and decipher the instructions, identify embedded face, eye, and ngerprint pho-
tographs, and in the case of face photographs, categorize them by gender or race. In testing,
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no automated attacker was able to successfully complete this task. The added complexity did
negatively impact human results, however, as MB-CAPTCHA's human success rate is 83.6%
due in large part to diculties users experienced in accurately categorizing the embedded
faces.
Finally, we developed aiCAPTCHA. This approach relies on object recognition tests,
asking users to identify embedded objects chosen from 100 dierent categories with 172
attributes. This expansive set of source images renders attacks by conventional image clas-
sication techniques impractical. aiCAPTCHA is designed to thwart attacks based on new
machine learning-based methods by incorporating a negative selection-based articial im-
mune system to remove CAPTCHAs from its test set that may be defeatable. It also in-
corporates an adaptive ltering mechanism which optimizes the generated CAPTCHA test
set to remove CAPTCHAs that have a poor record of human performance. When taken
together, these approaches provide a 94.6% human success rate and a 0% automated attack
success rate with a strong expectation the CAPTCHA will remain secure well into the future.
10.2 Future research directions
While this work oers several CAPTCHA implementations providing eective online secu-
rity while ensuring good user experiences, there are additional areas that can be explored
to provide further improvements in CAPTCHA performance. Several potential topics are
summarized below:
 Each human being has their own personal set of abilities and preferences. One user may
excel at the object recognition tasks in aiCAPTCHA, while another might be more suc-
cessful at solving fgCAPTCHA face detection-based CAPTCHAs, and a third might
be fastest at completing text-based CAPTCHAs. Developing a means of automatically
assessing which types of CAPTCHAs are best for an individual user and then selec-
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tively presenting those CAPTCHAs could signicantly help to reduce the friction that
CAPTCHAs can cause in the user experience.
 The ability to synthetically generate images including features designed to defeat au-
tomatic recognition algorithms could be game-changing. If it were possible to create
and embed images that would be miscategorized by automated attackers, distortions
and other features which hinder both humans and attackers could be reduced. This
would result in CAPTCHAs that are easier and faster for humans to solve without
sacricing resiliency against automated attacks.
 The development of reliable heuristics for identifying automated attackers' behavior
when solving CAPTCHAs could provide an added layer of security. In cases where
a heuristic suggests that the user might be a bot rather than a person, modications
could be made to the CAPTCHA process such as displaying higher diculty tests
or requiring multiple CAPTCHAs be completed to make it even less likely that an
automated attacker would succeed.
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Appendix
CAPTCHA demonstrations
Working demonstrations of Face Detection CAPTCHA, FaceDCAPTCHA, fgCAPTCHA,
FR-CAPTCHA, MB-CAPTCHA, and aiCAPTCHA, powered by the CAPTCHA Evaluation
Platform, are available at http://www.captcharesearch.com.
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